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Abstract 
This  paper  uses  an  unanticipated,  exogenous  doubling  of  the  legal  minimum  pension  in 
Ukraine as a unique quasi-experiment to evaluate the income effect on various aspects of 
labor supply among the elderly. In contrast to previous studies, the unusually simple pension 
eligibility  rule  allows  estimating  a  pure  causal  income  effect.  Applying  difference-in-
differences and regression discontinuity methods on two nationally representative data sets 
yields a retirement elasticity of 0.3. Men and women respond at different margins of labor 
supply but with similar overall effect. Despite retirement incentives being disproportionally 
large for low income earners old-age poverty declined significantly. 
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Benefit Generosity and the Income Effect on Labor Supply: Quasi-Experimental 
Evidence 
 
1  Introduction 
Most industrialized countries offer at least some social benefits which secure the basic 
needs for the working age population and the elderly. As the fiscal sustainability of these 
social insurance systems is being challenged by population ageing and adverse demographic 
developments, governments have been reconsidering the generosity of benefits. Most lower-
middle  income  countries,  on  the  contrary,  are  only  starting  to  build  up  or  expand  social 
security systems for their citizens. The population size, demographic development and rising 
demand for broader social development in countries such as China,  India,  Indonesia, and 
Russia will necessitate enormous policy reforms in the future. 
The question how the generosity of universal benefits affects labor supply incentives 
and retirement decisions has attracted substantial research, not least because it is concerned 
with  one  of  the  fundamental  aspects  of  consumer  theory:  whether  individuals  choose  to 
consume more goods or leisure when facing an increase in income. Empirical assessments, 
however, have been facing serious challenges in quantifying pure income effects of benefit 
generosity on labor supply. An ideal experiment to identify such an income effect has to 
satisfy two conditions: First, a truly exogenous and unanticipated change in benefit levels and, 
second,  a  benefit  design  in  which  labor  supply  decisions  are  not  affected  by  selection, 
substitution and option value effects.  
The following investigation is based on a unique quasi-experiment which meets both 
of these requirements and which changed the generosity of old-age benefits in a lower-middle 
income country. In 2003, the Ukrainian government initiated a comprehensive pension reform 
in order to reduce the fiscal burden of the pension system, which has been characterized by   3
full coverage of the population and low pension ages since Soviet times. Surprisingly, in 
September 2004, the policy objectives were changed towards poverty reduction leading to the 
implementation of a massive relative pension increase: Virtually overnight, all pensioners in 
Ukraine experienced more than a doubling in the legal minimum pension, resulting in an 
almost universal flat benefit level for all elderly. This jump to benefit levels of roughly 65 
USD per month (corresponding to 225 international 2005 PPP Dollars) provides the necessary 
exogenous income variation for this study.  
The second condition is satisfied owing to several particular features of the Ukrainian 
pension system:
1 Old-age pension benefits are neither means-tested nor conditional on actual 
retirement—and are thus, for instance, comparable to the Basic State Pension in the UK or 
any  other  universal  benefit  (e.g.,  survivor  benefits).  Since  benefits  can  be  received 
irrespectively of individual wealth and without the need to stop working, there are no self-
selection and substitution effects.
2 Furthermore, as the Ukrainian old-age pension system does 
not  reward  postponing  retirement  (i.e.,  benefit  deferral  does  not  increase  pension  wealth 
accruals),  the  analysis  is  not  confounded  by  option  value  effects.
3  In  this  distinctive 
institutional  setting,  the  rise  in  benefit  levels  induces  a  pure  income  effect  enabling 
individuals above the statutory pension age to afford more leisure (assuming that leisure is a 
normal good). These labor supply and retirement responses have a causal interpretation. A 
literature search does not reveal any other study on old-age pensions that can estimate the 
pure income effect without suffering from confounding factors like endogeneity, selection, 
substitution or option value effects.  
                                                           
1 On the advantage of analysing simple financial incentive rules in retirement studies see Asch, Haider and 
Zissimopoulos (2005). 
2 The substitution effect arises if employees who receive benefits have to sacrifice their labor earnings. 
3 Subsequently, changes were made in order to introduce additional pension accruals for deferred pensions, see 
below. These changes, however, did not affect the time period under consideration here.   4
A virtue of the Ukrainian system is that it specifically allows studying the retirement 
effect of women, an important subgroup which has been neglected for practical reasons in 
almost all previous studies: In most countries, women’s labor force participation decisions 
entail strong selection effects and their work histories are characterized by accumulated spells 
of temporary absence from the labor market as well as part-time and non-standard forms of 
employment.  In  contrast,  women  close  to  the  pension  age  in  modern  Ukraine  have  very 
different  work  histories:  Due  to  the  Soviet  full  employment  policy  the  labor  force 
participation of women was almost as high as that of men. Comprehensive child and health 
care facilities were provided at the work place. Furthermore, as part-time employment was 
virtually  non-existent,  working  40  hours  per  week  was  the  norm  for  men  as  well  as  for 
women. Consequently, almost all women are entitled to a full individual pension. Hence, 
retirement responses of women can be estimated thereby generating rare empirical insights for 
the many countries, in which female labor force participation rates are rising.  
This paper estimates the income effect with respect to the labor force participation 
decision (at the extensive margin) as well as with respect to work intensity (at the intensive 
margin).  Comparing  different  effects  for  different  measures  of  labor  supply  allows  an 
interpretation  of  how  the  rigidity  of  labor  market  institutions  interacts  with  the  pension 
increase. Those parts of the labor market that are still predominantly governed by the strict 
Labor Code from Soviet times show little labor supply effects with respect to work intensity 
as employees are often constrained in their choice of working hours.  
The empirical analysis is based on two independent, nationally representative data 
sets, the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey and the Ukrainian  Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey. The data sets contain a wealth of information including detailed pension take-up, 
individual health status, information on working years, household wealth and composition. In 
addition, one survey offers a retrospective labor market history until the Soviet era.    5
The analysis delivers the following key results: First, higher pension incomes have 
strong disincentive effects on the labor force participation of people around the pension age. 
The estimated income elasticity of retirement (0.32) is somewhat lower than in the previous 
literature. Second, the income effect of retirement is slightly smaller for women than for men 
at the extensive margin. The effect from the new pension policy induces a 37 to 47 percent 
increase in retirement probability at the statutory pension age for men and a 30 to 39 percent 
increase for women. Third, consistent with heterogeneous retirement incentives the estimated 
labor supply reductions are disproportionally large for the less educated—and are zero at the 
top of the educational distribution. This reflects the comparatively lower opportunity costs of 
foregone earnings caused by immediate retirement among the less educated. Fourth, labor 
supply  effects  at  the  intensive  margin  are  weak  on  average  and  are  only  significant  for 
specific population subgroups, namely women and the less educated who are concentrated in 
service sector occupations. Pension-eligible women who remain in the workforce after the 
pension  increase  reduce  their  yearly  working  hours  by  17  percent,  while  the  results  are 
insignificant for men. The explanation for the  generally weak adjustment at the intensive 
margin is the strict legal regulation of weekly working time. Fifth, from a welfare perspective, 
the pension increase has significantly reduced the likelihood of falling into poverty among the 
elderly  and  has  improved  the  old  generation’s  relative  welfare  position  compared  to  the 
working age population.  
This paper builds on the large literature investigating the disincentive effects of old-
age pensions on the labor supply of older people (e.g. Burtless, 1986; Moffitt, 1987; Krueger 
and Pischke, 1992; Blundell and Johnson, 1998; Blundell, Meghir and Smith, 2002; for an 
international overview see Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1999; Gruber and Wise, 1999 and 2004). 
Although economic theory suggests that financial incentives should have a causal effect on 
retirement, the size and significance of the empirical estimates vary greatly. This is partly   6
driven  by  differences  in  empirical  strategies:  Neither  cross-sectional  nor  panel  data  can 
correct the endogeneity bias of pension accruals. One way to overcome this problem is by 
exploiting natural experiments created by unexpected institutional changes that generate an 
exogenous variation in pension benefits. However, suitable reforms are scarce. Moffitt (1987) 
pioneers the evaluation of US Social Security changes by analyzing the effect of consecutive 
benefit rises in an aggregated macro time-series framework (in which confounding micro-
economic behavioral effects remain uncontrolled for). Krueger and Pischke (1992) exploit a 
purely exogenous downward adjustment of prospective pension entitlements for the so-called 
Notch cohorts through the 1977 amendment to the US Social Security Act. Surprisingly, the 
authors find little evidence that Social Security wealth affects retirement which might be due 
to uncontrolled endogenous behavioral adjustments.  
Given that Ukraine is a lower-middle income country, the present study also adds to 
the scarce evidence on retirement decisions in developing and emerging countries. Although a 
number of emerging countries have successfully introduced non-contributory pensions with 
broad  coverage  (Willmore,  2007;  Barr  and  Diamond,  2008)  and  despite  the  growing 
importance of population aging around the globe, very little is known about the labor market 
and retirement effects of pension systems in the developing world.
4 However, since many 
poor countries use their pension system as a key tool in the fight against poverty, estimates of 
(unintended)  retirement  and  labor  supply  effects  from  pension  income  are  particularly 
relevant to policy makers (cp. Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; Barr and Diamond, 2008). Among 
this group of countries, South Africa is the one in which questions regarding old-age pensions 
have been studied most intensively. The availability of good cross-sectional and panel data 
                                                           
4 The small retirement literature contrasts with an increasing literature on the effect of labor market regulations 
in developing and emerging countries (e.g. Harrison and Leamer, 1997). On institutional grounds, Freeman 
(2009) reviews some recent evidence on the pass-through of pension contribution rules on labor costs and labor 
demand in a number of developing countries. Barr and Diamond (2008) discuss some pension and retirement 
features of developing countries like relatively low pension ages and replacement rates, poor administrative 
capacities, widespread early retirement and the coverage problem of the informal sector.   7
has enabled research on various aspects of labor supply and income pooling of the old-age 
social pension (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller, 2003; Duflo, 2003; Ardington, Case and 
Hosegood, 2009); yet, this literature focuses exclusively on labor supply responses of adults 
in working-age. McKee (2008) instead does analyze old-age labor supply in Indonesia in 
response  to  family  transfers  which,  however,  are  potentially  endogenous.  Vélez-Grajales 
(2008) estimates a structural dynamic model to study the effect of changes in the pension 
system on contribution behavior in Chile. She finds strong incentives to contribute to the 
system  when  minimum  pensions  are  increased;  however,  her  labor  market  participation 
analysis  focuses  on  younger  persons.  The  only  paper  with  direct  evidence  on  retirement 
responses to social security receipt is by de Carvalho Filho (2008) who evaluates a multi-
faceted change in the pension eligibility rule for the subgroup of rural male workers in Brazil. 
A  simultaneous  change  in  several  pension  features—among  others  a  change  in  eligibility 
criteria and a doubling in minimum benefits—reduced male labor force participation in the 
relevant age groups by 38 percentage points. The concurrence of changes in various pension 
elements and the Brazilian data set, which does not allow determining the type of pension 
benefits (old-age, disability, social assistance) accurately, complicate the clear interpretation 
of  the  retirement  effects.  Fortunately,  the  Ukrainian  data  are  much  more  detailed  in  this 
respect. Costa (1995) provides evidence on a pure income effect from the turn-of-the-century 
Union Army Veteran Pension which was available to recruits whose health conditions had 
deteriorated due to the military service, irrespectively of their labor market status. Unlike a 
general old-age pension, benefit receipt was based on the examination of individual health 
status and thus restricted to a highly selected subgroup of the population. Recipients of Union 
Army Veteran pensions reduced their labor force participation strongly implying an income 
elasticity of retirement of 0.7.    
            This  paper  offers  three  novel  contributions:  First,  it  carefully  identifies  the  pure   8
income effect on labor supply at the extensive and intensive margin. The analysis adopts a 
quasi-experimental  approach  exploiting  a  substantial  increase  in  old-age  pension  income. 
Owing to the unique features of the pension system, the estimates reflect a short-run labor 
supply response that is not confounded by selection, substitution or option value effects. The 
results are robust across two independent data sets, different estimation methods such as the 
Difference-in-Difference as well as the Difference-in-Regression-Discontinuity designs and a 
number  of  sensitivity  tests.  A  discussion  of  potential  general  equilibrium  effects  clearly 
indicates that labor demand explanations cannot account for the observed retirement patterns. 
Second, unlike the previous literature this paper addresses the heterogeneity of labor supply 
effects  across  different  subgroups.  Retirement  decisions  of  both,  men  and  women,  are 
analyzed. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, labor force participation rates of women 
remained  high,  thus  facilitating  a  test  of  whether  men  and  women  respond  differently  to 
changes in benefits. Furthermore, the simple benefit and incentive structure also allows a 
consistent comparison of effects across the educational distribution. Third, remaining in the 
workforce even at very old age is not uncommon in many poor countries that lack social 
security systems. This paper also provides evidence on both poverty and labor supply effects 
from  an  existing  old-age  security  system  for  a  lower-middle  income  country.  The  policy 
challenges in these populous countries require sound empirical evidence.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  describes  the  main 
features of the Ukrainian pension system and the natural experiment. Section 3 provides details 
on the incentive structure of benefit generosity. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy 
and data used in this paper and presents the main retirement and labor supply results with 
several robustness tests. Results on absolute and relative poverty of the elderly are given in 
Section 5. This is followed by a brief discussion of potential general equilibrium effects of the 
reform in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with some implications for public policy.    9
2  The Unexpected Legal Minimum Pension Increase in Ukraine 
This paper exploits the exogenous income variation generated by a sudden and major 
increase of old-age pensions in Ukraine in September 2004. Ukraine is a lower middle income 
country with a GDP of 5,300 USD per capita PPP in 2003 (comparable to Peru and China), 
which at that time corresponded to 14 percent of the US level. After a dramatic collapse of the 
economic system and hyperinflation during the transition process in the 1990s, the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998/9 finally depleted household savings. In the early 2000s the economy 
experienced strong recovery with average annual growth rates of 7-8 percent and substantial 
real wage increases. Inflation rates were on average 7 percent during the same period. 
Ukraine  has  a  mandatory  defined  benefit  state  pension  system  which  is  de  facto 
exclusively  based  on  qualification  by  age.  As  in  several  other  emerging  countries,  the 
statutory state pension age is low with women qualifying from age of 55 and men from age of 
60.
5 Pensions are in practice linked to inflation. Apart from age, the second de jure eligibility 
criterion is the fulfillment of a minimal number of working years (20 years for women and 25 
years for men). Since the cohorts that approach the statutory pension age in the 2000s have 
accumulated most of their employment histories during the Soviet era in a labor market with 
full employment, the second criterion is fulfilled by more than 98 percent of men and women. 
In the year 2003, the Ukrainian pension system was characterized by a high level of benefit 
compression.  Although  the  generosity  of  old-age  pension  benefits  has  been  linked  to 
contribution payments, the level of benefit inequality remained limited due to the compressed 
wage  distribution  during  Soviet  times.  This  inherited  compression  used  to  be  further 
reinforced by a cap on pension benefits at the amount of three times the legal minimum wage 
(plus minor additions). At the same time the state pension scheme offered a minimum pension 
guarantee (benefit floor) creating a bimodal pension distribution (Noel, Kantur, Prigozhina, 
                                                           
5 There are few hazardous occupations in which the normal pension age is even lower, e.g., in mining.    10 
Rutledge  and  Fursova,  2006).  These  pension  features  imply  de  facto  a  non-contributory 
pension scheme with universal coverage. 
Despite modest replacement rates, the low pension ages in connection with a rapidly 
aging population put fiscal pressure on the state budget which led the government to discuss 
and ratify  a comprehensive pension reform which came into force in January 2003.
6 The 
predominant  reform  objectives  concerned  better  incentives  for  postponing  retirement  (by 
introducing  rather  modest  additions  for  pension  deferral  of  1  percent  per  year)  and  for 
compliance in contribution payments of high-income earners (by removing the pension cap).  
In September 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers surprisingly deviated from the reform 
path. The government issued a decree according to which the minimum pension level was to 
be increased in an attempt to reduce poverty among the elderly.
7 In real terms, the guaranteed 
floor rose from around 100 Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH) per month to 250 UAH (roughly 65 
USD) in early 2005. Figure 1 illustrates the substantial jump in the legal minimum pension 
that will serve as the identifying variation in the following labor supply and poverty analyses.  
The sharp rise in the minimum pension shifted the level of the pension floor and 
increased its bite: Average wage earners with a complete working history were now entitled 
to benefits that equaled the new minimum pension, and consequently 88 percent (!) of the 
13.3 million pensioners in Ukraine received a flat benefit rate (World Bank, 2005). Although 
at  a  higher  absolute  level,  overall  benefit  compression  had  further  increased.  Figure  2 
compares the distribution of pension benefits in the years 2003 and 2005. The figure clearly 
depicts  the  bimodal  structure  of  pension  benefits  before  the  pension  increase  of
                                                           
6 The new pension system was designed to rest on three pillars, with the first one resembling a mandatory pay-
as-you-go state pension system, the second one being a mandatory individual pension and the third one being 
private pension insurance. The second pillar was scheduled to start after 2007, while the other two pillars were 
scheduled for 2003 (for details see Handrich and Betliy, 2006). Contributions for the social security system 
(including PAYG system) are made by employees (1-2 percent) and employers (32 percent). Fiscal imbalances 
are smoothed out by budget subsidies. 
7 CM Decree on Improving the Pension Provision Level, No.1215.   11 
                              Figure 1: The legal monthly minimum pension over time 
 
Note: The reported values are deflated 2002 Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH). In September 2004, the Cabinet of 
Ministers decided to raise the legal minimum pension guarantee to the subsistence minimum. It was only in 
April 2005 that the government also amended the State Budget Law and implemented the new Pension Law 
which  codified  the  higher  pension  rights.  Pensions  are  in  practice  indexed  to  inflation.  Source:  Cabinet  of 
Ministers, Ukraine, own calculations. 
 
2004. The distribution is squeezed in between a low minimum pension floor (left vertical line) 
and the pension cap. Quite differently, the benefit distribution of 2005 (dashed distribution) is 
strongly shifted to the right and becomes unimodal. The previously binding benefit cap has 
been removed by then. 
The sharp increase in the pension level came as a surprise not only to the public but 
also to the national pension fund, which had to administer the policy change.
8 The sudden 
change was implemented without obeying the ordinary legislative procedures.  Indeed, the 
government  codified  the  higher  pension  rights  only  ex-post  in  April  2005  by  amending 
Article 28 on the ‘Minimum old-age pension’ of the State Pension Law.
9 The abruptness of 
                                                           
8 In the months prior to the change, the fund had already quarrelled with the government over funding from the 
State Budget and threatened to reduce instalments in the event that the financial situation did not improve. The 
government managed to provide sufficient funding for the 2004 benefit increase. 
9 The amendment reads as follows: “From 12 January 2005, in accordance with an earlier implemented change 
to Article 28 of the Ukrainian Law ‘On Mandatory State Pensions Insurance’, the provision of the minimal old-
age pension, which applies from a minimum of 25 service years for men and 20 service years for women, will be   12 
the pension rise is well documented (Kotusenko, 2004; World Bank, 2005; Góra, 2008) and 
most observers immediately expressed concern about the deviation from the government’s 
initial reform attempts, as exemplified in the following phrase:  
“The sudden and large increase in minimum pension level, initiated in September 2004, [...] 
changed the Pay as You Go (PAYG) pension system into one with a strong fiscal and social 
disequilibrium.” (World Bank, 2005: 1) 
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Note: The superimposed full vertical lines mark the average monthly legal minimum pension for 2003 (left) and 
2005 (right). The monthly legal minimum standard is computed as weighted average of the preceding 12 months. 
In  2005,  the  legal  minimum  pension  rose  slightly  between  January  and  April;  however,  pensioners  were 
supposed to be ex-post compensated by the government, so that the nominal pension level should have been the 
same for all months in 2005. Failure to provide this compensation might be responsible for the fact that some 
pensioners were paid slightly below the minimum wage. Pension incomes are reported in Ukrainian Hryvnia 
(UAH) and are deflated by national CPI to December 2002. Source: UHBS, own calculations. 
 
 
Total expenditures on the pension system increased from 9 to 15 percent of GDP 
between 2003 and 2005 (Góra, 2008: 34). The respective figure for the OECD average in 
2005 was 7.2 percent of GDP and around 10 percent even for countries with very mature 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
adjusted to the subsistence minimum which applies for persons who have lost their income generating capacity 
(332 UAH).” (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2006: 36) 
2003 
2005   13 
pension  systems  like  Germany  (OECD,  2009).  Only  by  using  massive  revenues  from 
privatization the government was able to keep the looming budget deficit below 2 percent 
(Góra, Rohozynsky and Sinyavskaya, 2010). 
The timing of the pension increase just few months before the general elections to be 
held in December 2004 generated rumors about the government having identified pensioners 
as  a  powerful  electorate  (Handrich  and  Betliy,  2006).  In  August  2004,  the  presidential 
campaign of contender Viktor Yushchenko announced to increase pensions in case of winning 
the  election.  As  the  campaign  of  incumbent  Viktor  Yanukovych  had  not  contained  any 
promises concerning pension generosity, the government anticipated this challenge with a 
quick pension rise (cp. Copsey, 2006). In order not to scare other population groups off, the 
new generosity was not financed through increases in taxes or pension contribution rates.  
Pensioners have often been seen as the losers of the post-Socialist transition process 
(for  evidence  to  the  contrary  see  Brück,  Danzer,  Muravyev  and  Weisshaar,  2010).  In 
comparison to Western economies, the shares of working pensioners were high in Ukraine 
before the pension increase. Two years after statutory pension age (i.e., at 62 and 57 years of 
age), roughly 40 percent of men and women had regular employment, and that share halved 
for those three years older (i.e., at 65 and 60 years of age). Traditionally, the phenomenon of 
working  pensioners  has  been  attributed  to  the  insufficient  pension  entitlements  of  many 
elderly, as evidenced for Russia (Kolev and Pascal, 2002). If poverty was the motivation 
behind the elderly staying at work, a significant non-anticipated pension increase like the one 
in 2004 should allow more pension-aged to afford retirement without falling into poverty. 
While this paper also evaluates the public policy objective of poverty reduction, the pension 
rise creates a unique opportunity to study labor supply responses as unintended side-effects of 
a welfare policy. Any behavioral reaction would require that the elderly expect the shift in   14 
pension income to persist. If Ukrainian citizens were unconfident about the permanency of the 
reform the labor supply responses will be underestimated. 
 
3  Benefit Generosity and Retirement Incentives 
The generous pension increase depicted in Figure 1 affects the labor supply decision 
of utility maximizing employees by reducing the cost associated with immediate retirement. 
Apart from this general insight from standard consumer theory it is possible to hypothesize 
about  the  strength  of  retirement  incentives  across  different  subgroups.  Basically,  the 
equalization of benefits after the increase suggests that retirement incentives are stronger for 
low income earners who gain disproportionally (also Noel et al., 2006). At closer inspection, 
however,  two  opposing  effects  determine  the  relative  retirement  incentives.  While  higher 
income  levels  are  associated  with  higher  opportunity  costs  of  giving  up  labor  income 
(implying that high income earners are relatively less likely to retire), they are also associated 
with lower marginal utility of income (implying that high income earners are relatively more 
likely to retire). In total, the effect is theoretically ambiguous. 
Consider  the  retirement  decision  as  a  discrete  choice  at  every  point  in  time;  the 
economic rationale whether or not to retreat from the labor market depends on the comparison 
of costs and benefits of prospective lifetime income flows under different retirement regimes. 
From an actuarial perspective, there exists one (or several) optimal point(s) in time at which 
the  income  flow  will  be  maximized  (cp.  Stock  and  Wise,  1991).  Instead  of  picking  the 
individual  optimal  retirement  date,  the  following  approach  compares  retirement  choices 
before  and  after  the  pension  increase.  It  computes  net  present  values  (NPV)  of  lifetime 
income that representative individuals would face upon reaching the pension age using UHBS 
data (for data details see below). The lifetime wealth at t can be computed as the sum of the 
social security wealth and the wealth from working beyond pension age:   15 
NPV =  ( ) ( )
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This formula reflects that an individual can choose to continue working and earn a 
yearly income Y in addition to the yearly pension benefits B up to the real retirement age R, 
after which B is the sole source of income.
10 The probability to live until period s is indicated 
by π(s).
11 Assume that a person reaching statutory pension age has to decide whether to keep 
on working or to retire immediately. For this decision, the entire lifelong wealth accumulation 
is relevant. To illustrate the incentive structure in Ukraine, two scenarios are presented: one in 
which the individual retires immediately upon reaching the pension age (R=0 and s=t) and 
one in which the individual works three more years before retiring.  
Table 1 compares the lifetime wealth for three broad educational groups of men and 
women in the respective scenarios  and  reports  the cost  attached to immediate retirement. 
Owing to differences in life expectancies the penalty for instantaneous retirement is lower for 
women. For both sexes, the results for 2003 show substantial variation between educational 
groups, with better educated individuals incurring higher costs for immediate retirement of up 
to 37 percent. Given the substantial pension compression this is not surprising. Comparing the 
wealth levels across years makes a general welfare improvement obvious. While the overall 
cost pattern remains the same (better educated incurring higher costs), the reduction in the 
retirement penalty is disproportionally large for the lower educational group. The pension 
increase reduces the cost of immediate retirement for a low educated worker by 35 percent, 
but  only  by  one  fifth  for  the  better  educated.  In  sum,  labor  supply  responses  should  be 
stronger among population groups that benefit disproportionally from the benefit rise.    
                                                           
10 As Ukraine is characterized by a high degree of benefit compression and therefore a low correlation between 
lifetime earnings and pension benefits, B can actually be treated as an education specific constant. 
11 To compute the NPV, one has to make assumptions about life expectancy at pension age and about time 
preferences (discount rates δ). Life expectancy values at pension age are taken from Góra (2008). The discount 
rate  is  3  percent  (as  we  are  comparing  very  narrowly  defined  scenarios  here,  the  simulations  are  not  very 
sensitive to the choice of the discount rate). For computational details see the Note of Table 1.   16 
Table 1: Net present total compensation at pension age in USD PPP, by education 
     
Cost of immediate 
retirement   
Cost of immediate 
retirement 
Difference      2003  Percent  2005  Percent 
Men (life expectancy at retirement 14 years)           
Lower education  Working 3 more years  6,286     10,547               
  Immediate retirement  4,312   31.4%  8,394   20.4%  -35.0% 
              
Completed secondary 
education  Working 3 more years  6,410     11,398               
  Immediate retirement  4,319   32.6%  8,451   25.9%  -20.8% 
              
Higher education  Working 3 more years  6,836     12,560               
  Immediate retirement  4,320   36.8%  8,871   29.4%  -20.2% 
Women (life expectancy at retirement 25 years)           
Lower education  Working 3 more years  7,601     14,429      
  Immediate retirement  6,221   18.2%  12,730   11.8%  -35.2% 
              
Completed secondary 
education  Working 3 more years  8,092     14,892      
  Immediate retirement  6,647   17.9%  12,753   14.4%  -19.6% 
              
Higher education  Working 3 more years  8,649     15,911      
  Immediate retirement  6,647   23.1%  12,982   18.4%  -20.5% 
Notes: Total compensation is calculated assuming a constant interest rate of 3 percent, constant across gender and educational level. Life expectancy at retirement varies with 
gender but is assumed constant across educational levels. Potential earnings are computed as median value for married individuals residing in non-rural areas. Yearly 
retirement benefits are computed at the median of educational groups and are assumed constant over time. According to government sources pensions were indexed to 
inflation plus a further amount of not less than 20 percent of the increase in the national average wage. In reality, pensions seem to be indexed to CPI only. Values report 
discounted total compensation until death in 2002 USD PPP. Life expectancy at pension age is taken from Góra (2008). Source: UHBS, own calculations.     17 
4  Retirement and Labor Supply Responses to the Pension Increase 
4.1  Data 
The empirical analysis is based on several cross sections (2002-2006) of the nationally 
representative  Ukrainian  Household  Budget  Survey  (UHBS)  which  interviews  25,000 
individuals and their households on an annual basis. Since data collection is performed by the 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine each December, the data set comprises two years prior, 
two years after the pension increase as well as the year of the change itself. The 2004 wave 
could not be used for the main analysis, since  the pension rise from late 2004 was fully 
reflected  only  in  the  annual  pension  income  of  2005.  To  prevent  from  other  potentially 
confounding factors, the analysis is cleanest when performed on two cross-sections before 
(2002/2003) and one after the pension increase (2005).
12 The UHBS includes a rich set of 
individual  and  household  characteristics,  including  information  on  employment,  annual 
incomes, household assets and health. The available information on total completed working 
years is crucial for testing the importance of the pension eligibility criterion that requires 
minimum  working  years.  As  expected,  only  a  minor  fraction  of  those  cohorts  reaching 
pension  age  has  worked  fewer  than  20/25  years  as  a  consequence  of  the  Soviet  full-
employment policy (1.9 percent of women and 2.0 percent of men).
13  
Since the UHBS does not contain information on working hours, a complementary 
analysis is performed using the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS). This is a 
high  quality  panel  data  set  providing  comparable,  but  much  more  detailed  labor  market 
information than its earlier established and well-known Russian counterpart (RLMS). The 
                                                           
12 As data further beyond the initial reform date are included into the analysis, the implicit phase-in of another 
reform will work against the retirement effect: Pensioners working beyond the statutory pension age see their 
monthly benefits grow by 1% per additional year of work. This effect is still negligible in 2005, but grows with 
each year thereafter that is added to the analysis. Thus, the option value effect of postponing retirement arises. 
13  Actually  a  measure  of  years  with  pension  contributions  would  be  preferable.  Although  informal  sector 
employment might be substantial in current Ukraine, the largest fraction of those close to the pension age has 
reached the minimum year requirement already during Soviet times. For instance, men born in 1944 who had 
started working in 1964 had already 28 years of working experience when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991.   18 
nationally  representative  ULMS  has  been  collected  by  the  Kiev  International  Institute  of 
Sociology in collaboration with an international network of economists in three years 2003, 
2004 and 2007 (Lehmann and Terrell, 2006). The unique feature of the ULMS is a large 
retrospective section providing detailed information on individual work histories since Soviet 
times. The survey covers individuals aged 15 to 72 with an initial sample size of more than 
6,000 respondents. As the vast majority of data collection took place in early summer (May to 
July), the panel comprises two waves prior to and one wave after the pension increase.  
The  main  dependent  variable  in  the  analysis  is  the  retirement  status  measured 
according  to  an  activity-benefit-based  definition.  A  person  is  classified  as  retired  if  not 
working  in  the  reference  week,  receiving  old-age  pension  benefits  and  subjectively  self-
categorizing him- or herself as retiree. Labor supply intensity is measured in hours per year, 
weeks per year and hours per week.
14 Among the independent variables, the main interest 
rests on the indicator of pension eligibility, which is based exclusively on the age criterion in 
the main analysis. Important control variables include individual characteristics (age, marital 
status, years of schooling, years of work experience), health status (a composite indicator for 
suffering from one of seven chronic diseases), household characteristics (household size, the 
presence of children up to age seventeen, the presence of a person with invalidity status, 
income generated from all other non-pension eligible household members and assets). Assets 
are proxied by  an indicator  generated from detailed information on housing and durables 
                                                           
14 It should be noted that the persistent structural inflexibility of the Ukrainian labor market allows little choice at 
the intensive margin of labor supply. Most workers are contracted full-time with 40 hours per week. More than 
sixty (fifty) percent of employees worked exactly 40 hours in an average (the reference) working week and the 
concentration on full time employment is even more pronounced for those working beyond pension age (Figure 
A1  in  the  Appendix).  A  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  reveals  that  the  hours  distributions  of  working  age  and 
pension age employees are not significantly different at conventional levels of working hours (up to 55 hours). 
The working time pattern is similar for men and women and there is no significant change in working hours 
between 2003 and 2007. The share of those working between 15 and 25 hours is higher among working age 
women  (7  percent)  than  among  working  age  men  (3  percent)  and  higher  among  pension  aged  women  (12 
percent) than among pension aged men (8 percent).   19 
through the use of factor analysis.
15 Finally, settlement location (place and region) and the 
sub-regional structure of the labor market (unemployment rate, share of employees in mining, 
share of employees in agriculture and share of state employment) are added as controls. A 
detailed description of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix (Table A1). 
 
4.2  Identification Strategy 
The identification strategy of this paper exploits the exogenous variation in Ukrainian 
pension benefits in September 2004. In order to prevent the results from being confounded by 
two potential selection effects, the analyses adopt a conservative approach that may translate 
into  lower  bounds  estimates:  First,  the  analysis  uses  pension  eligibility  instead  of  actual 
benefit receipt to circumvent the endogeneity of the pension claim decision. Consistent across 
both data sets and all years, 1 to 2 percent of those of pensionable age do not draw an old-age 
benefit. Non-take-up concerns mainly eligible individuals who kept working and were not 
officially  registered  at  their  current  place  of  residence.
16  Second,  pension  eligibility  is 
exclusively conditioned on an individual’s age. Although eligibility is de jure also based on 
the minimum working years requirement, the fulfillment of this second criterion depends on various 
decisions taken throughout the life, thus potentially introducing endogeneity bias. Both corrections 
affect only very small groups of the sample. Robustness checks classifying those with below 
20/25 years of work experience as ineligible or using actual benefit receipt confirm that the 
true effect is economically and statistically slightly bigger (see Table A2 and Table A3). 
                                                           
15  Initially,  factor  analysis  is  performed  on  a  wide  range  of  wealth  indicators  and  assets  including  house 
ownership, number of rooms, total living space per capita, eleven housing facilities (e.g., sewerage, type of 
heating, hot water etc.) and ten durables (e.g., refrigerator, computer, and car). As monetary values are not 
reported in the UHBS, ‘values’ are assigned according to age, condition at purchase and origin of product. From 
the factor analysis, the first factor is used as a household specific asset indicator. 
16 As enrolment into the State Pension scheme is automatic, the difference should not be due to informational 
deficits (cp. Duflo and Saez, 2003).   20 
Figure 3 and Figure A2 show age-specific retirement rates for the year prior to the 
pension rise (2003, displayed by dots) and the year after the pension increase (2005, displayed 
by triangles) for men and women. The vertical line marks the gender-specific pension age on 
the x-axis. The graphs are based on fitted values from weighted polynomial regressions. Early 
retirement rates, which can be observed for men and women to the left of the retirement 
discontinuity,  differ  very  modestly  over  time.  Above  pension  age,  however,  there  is  an 
apparent upward shift in retirement rates after the benefit increase of 2004. The discontinuity 
at the pension age has widened significantly between 2003 and 2005. This gap (and not the 
one from entering pension age) is the retirement response of the minimum pension increase of 
2004. The following econometric estimation of this effect uses Difference-in-Differences and 
Difference-in-Regression-Discontinuity approaches. 
 
4.3  Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
The Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimator exploits the discontinuity in pension 
eligibility at pension age to compare changes over time in outcomes between those eligible 
(treatment group) and those highly comparable but not yet eligible (control group) for an old-
age  pension.  The  universal  and  exogenous  change  in  pension  generosity  permits  the 
estimation of causal labor supply and retirement responses by comparing outcomes across 
these two groups before and after the pension increase (the treatment). As a pure before-after 
comparison of outcomes in the treatment group may be affected by time specific factors that 
are common to all workers in Ukraine, the control group is used to difference away general 
economic  trends,  e.g.,  changing  macroeconomics  conditions  and  aggregate  labor  demand. 
Keeping in mind that the analysis is based on pension eligibility rather than actual benefit 
receipt, the presented results have to be understood as lower bound estimates.  
   21 
4.3.1  Main Results 
Table  2  illustrates  the  identification  strategy  by  mean  comparisons  in  two-by-two 
matrices. Women exhibit lower retirement rates than men across all cells as indicated in the 
upper panel. Also, the behavioral response to reaching pension age is stronger for men (47 
percentage points) than for women (44 percentage points). The time trend for those below 
pension age is (insignificantly) negative, reflecting the increasing labor force participation 
during the growth period of the mid 2000s in Ukraine. However, for those above pension age, 
the time trend runs in the opposite direction, leading to a treatment effect of 17.6 percentage 
points for men and 13.3 percentage points for women. Retirement rates rose by 37 and 30 
percent as a result of the pension increase.  
The  lower  panels  report  results  from  two  falsification  exercises,  the  first  one 
simulating  an  artificial  pension  age  at  58  (for  men)  and  53  (for  women)  and  the  second 
simulating  the  pension  increase  between  the  years  2002  and  2003.  The  first  control 
experiment indicates that early retirement rates increased with age but remained fairly stable 
over  time.  The  negative  time  trend  at  younger  ages  reconfirms  the  general  positive 
employment trend. Control experiment two shows that changes between 2002 and 2003 were 
modest and insignificantly different from zero. The only puzzling effect is the (almost weakly 
significant) increase in early retirement between 2002 and 2003 for men. However, this effect 
is driven by compositional changes of the relatively small male sample.
17 The remainder of 
this section investigates the treatment effects in greater detail. 
                                                           
17 The density of the comparison groups around the discontinuity threshold is unequal between years as birth 
cohorts differ in size. This effect is obviously not caused by sorting around the threshold but by relatively small 
birth cohorts during WWII. The change in densities over time is especially pronounced for men (Figure A3): 
Between 2003 and 2005, the war-related smaller birth cohorts move across the discontinuity, resulting in less 
precise estimates below pension age in 2003 and above pension age in 2005.    22 
The simple mean estimates can be generalized in a regression framework in order to 
test the robustness of the results:
18 
y = β0 + β1P + β2T + β3P*T + β‘X + u          (2) 
 
 
with  y  being  the  dependent  variable  (retirement  or  labor  supply  intensity),  P  being  an 
indicator for pension eligibility (as compared to the non-eligibility N), T being an indicator for 
the post-treatment period (i.e. the year 2005 for UHBS as well as 2007 for ULMS) and P*T 
being an interaction effect of P and T. X is a vector of the before mentioned individual, 
household  and  regional  controls.  If  the  pension  increase  was  truly  exogenous  and  non- 
anticipated, the inclusion of covariates should lead to only modest changes of the results 
presented so far. General differences in retirement rates between pension eligible and non-
eligible individuals are captured by β1. For males, it compares retirement rates among workers 
aged 58 and 59 with those among workers aged 61 and 62, while it compares women aged 53 
and 54 with women slightly above pension age, 56 and 57 years old.
19 The β2 coefficient 
captures changes over time which are common to treatment and control group as well as 
independent of the scheduled policy. Hence, the approach relies on the assumption that no 
general labor market shock affects the two groups differently. The coefficient of interest is the 
difference-in-difference estimator β3 which reports the average treatment effect on those who 
are eligible for the treatment:   
                                                           
18 Subscripts are ignored in the equation for expositional reasons. The equation is estimated by linear probability 
models. As a robustness check a Probit formulation of the model is applied, which yields slightly larger marginal 
fixed effects (Table A2). Recent advances in the econometric literature have suggested the use of bounded 
estimation for discrete DiD as counterfactual values might potentially become negative in the binary case (Athey 
and Imbens, 2006). In the current analysis, this concern is of less relevance as retirement levels of an appropriate 
control group are not expected to change radically over time.  
19 As exact birth dates  were not  made available in the UHBS, all those  with age exactly at the retirement 
threshold are excluded from the sample. Generally, it would be desirable to observe the same individuals over 
time. This can be done using the ULMS whereby the general results are confirmed (Table A4); however, the 
smaller sample size requires a broader choice of comparison age groups (three years). A drawback of the ULMS 
data is the gap in the observation period. The first post-reform observation is in 2007 and thus already two and a 
half years after the reforms took place. On the one hand this gives an indication of the persistence of the effect; 
on the other hand, it becomes harder to interpret the size of the treatment effect.   23 
 
 
Figure 3: Retirement rates across age and years 
 





























































Note: Fitted values are predictions from weighted polynomial regressions (of degree two). The use of other polynomials (cubic, quartic) yields similar results. Estimation 
performed for ten-year brackets at both tails. Source: UHBS, own calculations.   24 
( ) ( ) 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 N N P P y y y y - - - = b             (3) 
 
 
If the treatment after 2004 is associated with increased retirement rates, this coefficient 
should be positive and significantly different from zero. As higher benefits are paid to all 
claimants without means or retirement testing, the treatment effect can be interpreted as a pure 
income  effect  of  the  pension  increase.  A  comprehensive  way  of  controlling  for  various 
composition  effects  is  by  estimating  equation  (2)  while  including  sets  of  covariates  in  a 
stepwise fashion. Table 3 reports results from this DiD estimation and confirms that pension 
eligible  individuals  had  higher  retirement  rates  after  the  pension  increase.
20  While  the 
inclusion  of  covariates  substantially  improves  the  fit  of  the  regressions,  the  size  of  the 
coefficient  of  interest  decreases  only  very  modestly.  The  inclusion  of  health  controls  in 
Column  (4)  clearly  indicates  that  the  observed  retirement  pattern  is  not  driven  by  a 
deteriorating health situation of the population, although Ukraine has indeed experienced a 
severe  health  crisis  during  the  transition  process  (Brainerd  and  Cutler,  2005).  Given  the 
general improvement of the welfare situation of Ukrainian households during the 2000s, one 
might argue that the results reflect welfare gains stemming from other household members. 
However, income sources generated by younger co-residing adults as well as household asset 
holdings are controlled for in Columns (5) and (6). Additionally, when restricting the sample 
to households without co-residing working age adults the findings are robust.
21 
 
                                                           
20 Robustness checks comparing the years 2002/3 and 2004/5 as well as 2002 and 2005 are found in Table A5.  
21 The treatment effect for men increases to 0.183 in the full control case, while the treatment for women remains 
stable (0.109). Although it may seem desirable to present all results for households without cohabiting working 
age members, most households in Ukraine comprise two or more generations. Forty six percent of women aged 
55 cohabit with at least one adult aged below 52. For men aged 60, the respective number is 39 percent. Also, 
only a minor fraction of the elderly live alone (12 percent of women and 15 percent of men). Overall, these 
cohabitation patterns lead to relatively small sample sizes.   25 
Table 2: Retirement rates before and after the pension increase—extensive margin  
 
Experiment of Interest: Year of benefit increase 2004, pension age at 60 (men) and 55 (women) 
  
Panel A. Men  2002-2003  2005      Panel B. Women  2002-2003  2005    
 N=1097  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference    N=1845  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference 
Age 58-59  0.215  0.166  -0.049    Age 53-54  0.111  0.078  -0.034 
   (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.042)      (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Age 61-62  0.689  0.816  0.127    Age 56-57  0.552  0.651  0.099 
   (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.041)      (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
Difference  0.474  0.649  0.176    Difference  0.440  0.573  0.133 
  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.059)      (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.041) 
Control experiment 1: Artificial pension age at 58 (men) and 53 (women)    
Panel A. Men  2002-2003  2005      Panel B. Women  2002-2003  2005    
 N=685  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference    N=1334  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference 
Age 57  0.171  0.159  -0.012    Age 52  0.078  0.062  -0.016 
   (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.051)      (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.027) 
Age 58-59  0.215  0.166  -0.049    Age 53-54  0.111  0.078  -0.034 
   (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.042)      (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Difference  0.044  0.008  -0.037    Difference  0.033  0.015  -0.018 
  (0.044)  (0.049)  (0.066)      (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.034) 
Control experiment 2: Artificial increase in benefit generosity between 2002 and 2003    
Panel A. Men  2002  2003      Panel B. Women  2002  2003    
 N=757  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference    N=1106  Pre-increase  Post-increase  Difference 
Age 58-59  0.163  0.266  0.103    Age 53-54  0.129  0.094  -0.034 
   (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.054)      (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
Age 61-62  0.692  0.685  -0.006    Age 56-57  0.536  0.564  0.028 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.045)      (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.047) 
Difference  0.529  0.420  -0.110    Difference  0.408  0.470  0.062 
  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.070)      (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.055) 
      Note: Reported values are age and gender specific retirement rates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: UHBS, own calculations.    26 
The effect of pension generosity on the probability to retire can be expressed as an 
income elasticity of retirement (∂R/∂B)(B/R): a 10 percent rise in benefit income increases the 
probability  to  retire  between  3.2  percent  (when  using  the  benefit  eligibility  rule)  and  6.6 
percent (when using real benefit receipt) at the mean.
22 The former and more conservative 
estimate is smaller than income elasticities of retirement reported in the existing literature for 
real benefits, while the latter falls between estimates from the 1960s/70s in the US (Krueger 
and Pischke, 1992) and the early 20th century US (Costa, 1995) or Brazil (de Carvalho Filho, 
2008). Overall, the results from Ukraine suggest that retirement is relatively inelastic with 
respect to income, a finding that is consistent with the previous literature. 
The bottom panel of the regression table replicates the control experiment 2 for men 
and women with the stepwise inclusion of covariates. As before, there is no indication of a 
structural change between 2002 and 2003. The initially suspicious coefficient for men drops 
considerably in size and remains insignificant. 
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that the comparison of retirement rates 
of those immediately below pension age over time constitutes a suitable counterfactual for the 
treatment group. There are good reasons to believe that this untestable assumption holds here. 
As pension ages are rather low in Ukraine, it seems sensible to compare individuals shortly 
before  and  after  reaching  the  threshold  without  the  risk  of  comparing  adults  of  different 
physical  ability  to  work.  The  two  groups  also  show  little  differences  in  most  observable 
characteristics except for those that are directly related to age (age, years of work experience, 
widowhood) (Table A7). Still, one might fear that unobservable characteristics differ. The 
main concern stems from the substantial educational expansion that took place in the Soviet 
Union between 1958 and 1961, which aimed at providing every Soviet citizen with at least a 
basic  secondary  degree.  The  male  cohorts  analyzed  in  this  paper  were  affected  by  this 
                                                           
22 OLS and 2SLS estimates using actual benefit receipt and eligibility as instrument are reported in Table A3.   27 
expansion and a rising share of secondary educational degrees can be detected among the 
respective  male  cohorts  between  the  years  2002  and  2006.  The  share  of  older  men  with 
secondary education increases by more than 12 percentage points within only five survey 
years (see Table A8).
23 As better educated individuals retire later in Ukraine—a consistent 
finding across data sets and waves—the compositional change directly impacts retirement 
rates. Controlling for educational attainments does not convincingly solve this problem as 
some highly able youth might have been left without secondary degree in older cohorts due to 
the lack of educational facilities while their younger fellows were better educated. However, 
the potential bias introduced by the educational expansion will lead to underestimating the 
retirement effect of the pension increase as better educated younger cohorts should exhibit 
retirement rates that are lower than they would have been under the educational composition 
of slightly older cohorts. Consequently, estimates for men are downward biased.    
If  the  negative  labor  supply  effect  was  truly  induced  by  the  pension  increase,  the 
retirement rates of those slightly above pension age should exhibit a structural break over 
time, while those of the control group should remain even. Figure 4 suggests that the labor 
supply of those below pension age remained indeed roughly constant between 2002 and 2006. 
In contrast, the share of retirees (up to two years after the statutory pension age) increased 
between 2003 and 2005 by a fraction comparable to the DiD estimates. More formally, while 
retirement rates for the treatment groups in 2005 and 2006 are significantly different from the 
base year 2002, the T-statistics for differences of annual retirement rates of the control groups 
below pension age remain well below two (Table A9). As there were no others policies in 
place which  could have changed retirement incentives,
24 the reduced labor supply can be 
causally attributed to the increase in the legal minimum pension guarantee.   
                                                           
23 Women of the affected birth cohorts were already older than the treatment group.  
24 Most importantly, there were no changes in taxes in order to finance the pension expenditures.   28 
 
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences—stepwise inclusion of covariates 
 
   (1)     (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
   Dependent variable  Retired (0/1)     
 
 
Men, aged 58/59 vs. 61/62 
 
Experiment of interest: Treatment effect of minimum pension increase in September 2004 
Treatment effect  0.176***  0.158***  0.147**  0.143**  0.149***  0.151*** 
  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Observations  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097 
R-squared  0.272  0.326  0.368  0.373  0.383  0.385 
Control experiment: Treatment assumed in 2003 
Treatment effect  -0.101  -0.094  -0.063  -0.061  -0.060  -0.057 
  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Observations  757  757  757  757  757  757 
R-squared  0.212  0.288  0.327  0.330  0.335  0.339 
 
 
Women, aged 53/54 vs. 56/57 
 
Experiment of interest: Treatment effect of minimum pension increase in September 2004 
Treatment effect  0.133***  0.126***  0.105*** 0.105***  0.106***  0.109*** 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Observations  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845 
R-squared  0.271  0.326  0.380  0.380  0.386  0.390 
Control experiment: Treatment assumed in 2003 
Treatment effect  0.053  0.064  0.060  0.060  0.060  0.056 
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Observations  1106  1106  1106  1106  1106  1106 
R-squared  0.238  0.296  0.350  0.350  0.355  0.358 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X  X 
Individuals controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household contr. & 
assets 
—  —  —  —  X  X 
Labor market structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Linear probability models with dependent variable: retired. Individual controls include age, marital status, 
years of schooling, years of work experience; health status is a composite indicator for suffering from one of 
seven chronic diseases; household controls include household size, the presence of children up to age 17, the 
presence of a person with invalidity status, income generated from all other non-pension eligible household 
members and assets; labor market structure comprises the sub-regional unemployment rate, share of employees 
in mining, in agriculture and share of state employment. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 






Figure 4: Retirement rates for different age groups across survey years 
 
Panel A. Men                  Panel B. Women 
 
Note: The reform year 2004 is excluded as exact birth dates are unavailable and as income sources are reported on an annual basis. Source: UHBS, own calculations.   30 
As hypothesized in Section 3, retirement incentives should vary across the educational 
distribution  as  the  benefit  increase  was  disproportionally  large  for  low-income  earners. 
Indeed,  Figure  5  reveals  that  the  stronger  actuarial  retirement  incentives  among  the  less 
educated translate into stronger retirement responses. The downward sloping line links the 
levels of treatment effects across the educational distribution.
25 Up to 14 years of schooling, 
the pension increase induces additional retirement, while no impact can be detected for the 
most educated. The standard errors for the estimates presented in Figure 5 confirm that there 
is no statistical retirement effect above 14 years of schooling (Table A10). The group of those 
with nine years of schooling is small in size, leading to an imprecise estimate. 
 
Figure 5: Difference-in-Differences in educational CDF 
 
Source: UHBS, own calculations. 
 
Table 4 gives further insights into heterogeneous retirement incentives by comparing 
several  subgroups  (according  to  gender,  health  status  and  region).  The  first  difference 
concerns the question whether women and men respond to a change in pension generosity 
differently. As mentioned before, women retire relatively later than men (a setting that is quite 
                                                           
25 The treatment effects across the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) are estimated by interaction dummies 
between levels of education (measured in years of schooling) with the treatment indicator.   31 
unusual for most countries of the world but related to the especially severe health crisis of 
men; Brainerd and Cutler, 2005), but given their relatively lower labor incomes they might 
incur  stronger  retirement  incentives  from  the  equalizing  pension  increase.  The  first  two 
columns replicate the basic result for men and women. As reported above, the corresponding 
marginal effects of these treatment effects are 37 percent and 30 percent and the income 
elasticities of retirement are minus 0.35 and minus 0.32, respectively. The bottom line reports 
the F statistics of a Chow test and clearly rejects the equality of the coefficients, so that 
β3,female < β3,male. This result stands in contrast to the labor supply literature on the working age 
population that normally finds stronger responses among women (Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999).  However,  the  case  might  be  different  for  individuals  close  to  pension  age. 
Theoretically,  the  argument  relating  to  women’s  comparative  advantage  in  household 
production is of less relevance after the children have left. Also, in joint retirement decisions 
(a topic briefly addressed below) women are often the second mover. Finally, women are 
more likely to be employed in occupations that allow a gradual retreat from the labor market. 
The section covering labor supply responses at the intensive margin will show that women, 
unlike men, reduce yearly working hours. Taking into account the response at the intensive 
margin, women’s overall response seems comparable to that of men. 
Second, one can use the exogenous pension increase to study the relationship between 
health status and retirement. Individuals with health conditions that result in the inability to 
perform work are by definition excluded from the current analysis. The question remains 
whether those with reduced working capacities respond differently than those without any 
impediments. Research investigating the impact of health status on retirement is complicated 
by reporting bias and the potential endogeneity of health status. Health at older ages is—
among  other  determinants—a  consequence  of  individual  decisions  taken  throughout  life. 
Empirical evidence suggests that chronically ill persons retire earlier as a result of lower labor   32 
market returns and higher disutility from working (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Given that 
chronically ill persons will be more likely to retire early, they should be less responsive to 
retirement incentives at older ages. In the parlance of the evaluation literature, chronically ill 
persons resemble ‘always takers’, for whom the treatment effect at the retirement threshold 
would  not  be  identified.  As  columns  (3)  and  (4)  suggest,  this  is  indeed  the  case.  Upon 
reaching pension age, more than 80 percent of the chronically ill are already out of the labor 
force and the treatment coefficient remains insignificant.  
Despite  the  small  sample  size,  the  Chow  test  again  rejects  the  equality  of  the 
coefficients. This suggests that the measurement of the income effect at normal pension age 
has little explanatory power for the chronically ill. Thus, column (5) tests whether chronically 
ill  people  react  at  the  minimum  service  year  threshold  for  early  retirement  (20  years  for 
women, 25 years for men). Therefore, interactions between dummies indicating service time 
above the minimum threshold, chronic disease and the post-increase period are included in a 
pooled  regression.  The  coefficient  of  interest  is  the  triple  interaction  between  the  three 
dummies:  reaching  the  minimum  threshold  as  a  chronically  ill  person  after  the  pension 
increase induces 19 percentage points of additional retirement.  
Finally,  poorer  regions  should  benefit  more  from  the  pension  increase  since  the 
pension increase leveled (the modest) regional variation in pension benefits that existed until 
2003. Due to the substantial geographic variation in Ukraine’s economic structure as well as 
wage and pension levels, a regional comparison is useful. After the pension increase, a flat 
benefit rate applied for virtually every pensioner thus producing variation in the magnitude of 
the pension gain. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 confirm that the retirement effect from the 
pension increase was stronger in regions which had an above median pension level growth 
between 2003 and 2005 and the difference between the two coefficients is significant.     33 
Ukraine is characterized by an economic gradient between urban and rural areas that is 
typical  for  many  emerging  countries.  Urban  and  rural  residents  respond  in  a  statistically 
significant different manner to the benefit change. However, differences between urban and 
rural population can be entirely explained by composition effects: when adding the full set of 
controls, the coefficients converge closely to 0.119 for urban and 0.124 for rural residents. 
 
4.3.2  Discussion and Robustness Checks 
The basic identifying assumptions have been presented above. This section provides 
further support for the methodological approach by addressing four potential caveats. First, 
identification  might  not  only  be  jeopardized  if  treatment  and  control  group  differed 
structurally,  but  also  if  the  pension  increase  affected  the  control  group,  i.e.  those  below 
pension age and their incentives for retirement. The pension policy might increase prospective 
old-age benefits and net present wealth levels for those below pension age, and subsequently 
induce early retirement if people possessed private savings and the freedom to choose early 
retirement. The loss of household savings during the 1990s—a fact that is reflected in the low 
coverage  of  modern  saving  technologies
26—makes  such  a  shift  among  the  control  group 
rather unlikely. The control experiment 1 of Table 2 confirms a reduction rather than increase 
in early retirement. However, if early retirement incentives were reduced simultaneously with 
the rise in pension benefits, the findings could simply reflect a change in early retirement 
behavior  or  in  occupational  early  retirement  rules.
27  Early  retirement  is  indeed  of  some 
importance in Ukraine, as workers in hazardous occupations (e.g. miners) have been entitled 
to earlier retirement since Soviet times; however, the empirical evidence has remained scant.  
                                                           
26 According to the ULMS, only 8.9 percent of households held a savings bank account in 2007, 4.4 percent a 
life insurance, and 2 percent securities. Data for the earlier period are unavailable but were certainly lower. 
27 The official rules for early retirement were unchanged during the observation period. Also, unlike in many 
industrialized countries, labor force exits from unemployment into retirement are rather unusual. Only 2 percent 
of current pensioners left the labor force directly from an unemployment spell into retirement.   34 
Table 4: Difference-in-Differences—heterogeneous effects across subgroups 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
               
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 






Treatment effect  0.176***  0.133***  0.144***  0.078    0.120**  0.182*** 
  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.174)    (0.047)  (0.046) 
Pension age  0.474***  0.440***  0.450***  0.490***    0.412***  0.495*** 
  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.085)    (0.028)  (0.032) 
Post-increase  -0.049  -0.034  -0.045**  0.141  0.407  0.000  -0.098*** 
  (0.042)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.149)  (0.075)  (0.026)  (0.031) 
Min service years 
(MSY) 
        0.429*** 
(0.047) 
   
MSY*post-increase          -0.183**     
          (0.075)     
Chronic          0.127 
(0.139) 
   
MSY*Chronic          -0.097 
(0.142) 
   
MSY*Post-
increase*Chronic 
        0.189*** 
(0.073) 
   
Observations  1097  1845  2781  161  4416  1501  1441 
R-squared  0.272  0.271  0.282  0.389  0.290  0.266  0.322 
F test                  16.4                             3.0                         18.5 
Note: Linear probability models with dependent variable: retired. F test for hypothesis that coefficients of two comparison groups are significantly different. Critical F-
value for 2942 observations is 2.37. Regression (5) is a pooled regression containing interactions between Minimum Service Years (20 for women, 25 for men), post-
increase period and chronic. Sample is extended to five pre-retirement years during which the majority of early retirement takes place. Shadow wage calculated as potential 
yearly earnings in gender-age-education-region cell, correcting for labor force participation. These cells contain predictions from a Heckit models which accounts for 
selection into the working state by exploiting pension age as an exclusion restriction. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 
UHBS, own calculations.       35 
Luckily, the ULMS permits shedding some light on the issue, as all job changes and 
job  quits  are  recorded  retrospectively  to  the  year  1986.  Of  the  entire  2003  sample,  18.9 
percent (1,633 respondents) retired between 1986 and 2003 and of those 8.0 percent retired 
through an early retirement scheme.
28 However, these numbers mask some variation over 
time: While early retirement schemes were quite common at the end of the Soviet period (14 
percent of all retirees in 1986) they were later substantially reduced. During the period under 
consideration (2003 to 2005) early retirement exits account for 5 to 6 percent of the total. 
Respondents from hazardous occupations might not consider their retirement early though if 
the normal pension age in these occupations is below the statutory pension age. Therefore an 
indicator is constructed for those claiming to retire regularly but below the national normal 
pension age. It turns out that the share of those in early normal retirement is slightly above 20 
percent of all retirees per year and this value has been unchanged since 1996. Early normal 
retirement is common in some specific occupations and predominantly in the mining sector. 
As the mining industry is geographically concentrated in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions excluding these from the analysis captures the majority of early normal retirees. This 
exercise suggests no change to the previous results (see Table A11). 
Second, the validity of the DiD estimates may be potentially impaired if household 
composition  responded  to  the  availability  of  financial  resources  (Edmonds,  Mammen  and 
Miller,  2005;  Engelhardt,  Gruber  and  Perry,  2005).  Under  the  assumption  that  household 
members at least partially pool their resources, changes in their relative contribution might 
introduce  incentives  to  split  or  unite  households.  To  test  for  endogeneity  in  household 
composition,  models  similar  to  (2)  are  estimated  which  employ  household  size  and  the 
number  of  working  age  household  members  as  dependent  variables.  If  households  were 
significantly larger or smaller after the pension rise, we could not reject the hypothesis that 
                                                           
28 Early retirement is self-reported and coded from a multiple answer question. To check consistency of the 
responses, the answers were compared with the computed individual age at retirement.   36 
household composition is responsible for the observed labor supply patterns. However, for 
both measures of household composition, the ‘treatment’ effect from the pension increase is 
zero  (Table  A12).  Additional  support  comes  from  the  ULMS  panel  data,  which  can  be 
restricted to households that do not change their composition after 2004. The results based on 
this  subsample  confirm  the  previous  findings.  Hence,  endogenous  household  formation 
cannot explain the observed retirement patterns (Table A13).  
Third,  closely  related  to  household  composition  is  the  fact  that  partners  may  take 
retirement decisions jointly. As Ukraine has a traditionally high rate of female labor force 
participation  joint  retirement  decisions  will  play  a  role  in  this  context;  however,  the  full 
complexity  of  the  topic  remains  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  From  a  theoretical 
perspective, partners wish to customize retirement dates for reasons like complementarities in 
their  utility  functions,  shared  tastes  or  similar  economic  environment  and  wealth  (Hurd, 
1990). According to some descriptive evidence on the joint retirement decision of couples, 
wives seem to become more likely to retire immediately upon reaching their (young) pension 
age  (Table  A14  and  Table  A15).  Nevertheless,  joint  retirement  seems  to  have  increased 
within  the  joint  retirement  frontier  (the  shaded  area  of  Table  A15)  suggesting  that  the 
additional income allows couples to synchronize retirement where it was not feasible before. 
Finally, the presented DiD estimates might be sensitive to the bandwidth choice for 
the comparison groups around the pension age. The treatment effect decreases in regressions 
based on broader comparison groups (see Table A16 for a wide range of bandwidth choices). 
This seems reasonable as we include ever-older age groups in our data aggregate which had 
already higher pre-reform retirement rates. In other words, the additional retirement effect of 
the pension increase decreases with age as already evidenced graphically in Figure 3. The fact 
that the basic results and the precision of the estimates are preserved in a wide range of 
settings confirms their robustness.   37 
4.3.3  Intensive Margin of Labor Supply 
The  research  on  retirement  decisions  typically  distinguishes  between  labor  supply 
responses at the extensive and the intensive margin. In the latter case, persons retire gradually 
and reduce the number of working hours or working weeks rather than fully retreating from 
the labor market. In a setting with unconstrained working hours choices, labor supply theory 
suggests that individuals reduce their work effort continuously when pension benefits are 
raised. In practice, however, the choice set of hours is likely to be discrete and limited such 
that people with strong preference for leisure will retire completely, while people with strong 
preferences for consumption will stay in work and presumably work more hours than desired. 
As briefly mentioned before, labor relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine remain strongly regulated 
by the state as the Labor Code prescribes an average working week of 40 hours. Regulated 
exemptions apply in hazardous occupations and, for instance, for teachers. Enterprises do 
generally not promote more flexibility in working time rules as compensation for overtime 
work is costly. Part-time work was very untypical during Soviet times and employment with 
reduced  working  hours  is  only  emerging  slowly.
29  Instead,  working  time  is  more  often 
adjusted through weeks per year rather than hours per week. This is facilitated by the fact that 
the Labor Code allows flexibility in annual vacation between 24 and 69 days. 
The analysis of the effect at the intensive margin is based on the ULMS and focuses 
on  three  dependent  variables:  yearly  working  hours,  weeks  worked  per  year  and  weekly 
working  hours.  The  longitudinal  nature  of  the  data  allows  controlling  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity and thus ensures that the results are not confounded by changing educational 
quality of treatment and control group across years.  
                                                           
29 The questionnaire of the ULMS asks individuals for their working hours and whether they normally work 40 
hours; if not, respondents can chose from a list of reasons, most of which are related to exogenous shocks, like 
‘material shortage’ or ‘sickness’. Almost half of those working below forty hours per week report that their 
working time is considered full-time in their occupation (e.g., teachers). Only 15 percent of respondents want to 
work deliberately less than full time, and this ratio was unchanged between 2003 and 2007.   38 
Table 5: Working time before and after the pension increase--intensive margin 
 
Men         Women      Least educated (men and women)*   


















Panel A: Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Age 58-59  2086.0  2074.0  -12.0   Age 53-54  1626.9  1649.9  22.9   Below ret. age  1360.6  1333.6  -27.1 
  (95.8)  (105.7)  (45.4)     (251.9)  (257.9)  (55.5)     (415.3)  (435.3)  (112.8) 
Age 61-62  1879.8  1982.2  102.4   Age 56-57  1834.6  1577.1  -257.5   Above ret. age  1414.1  927.0  -487.1 
  (42.3)  (66.3)  (64.6)     (249.3)  (245.9)  (66.2)     (337.8)  (371.1)  (163.6) 
Difference  -206.3  -91.8  114.4   Difference  207.7  -72.8  -280.5   Difference  53.5  -406.6  -460.1 
  (90.9)  (100.7)  (80.7)     (74.1)  (86.6)  (86.0)     (181.8)  (244.9)  (200.7) 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Age 58-59  48.9  49.5  0.69   Age 53-54  45.6  46.7  1.06   Below ret. age  38.9  40.5  1.64 
  (1.11)  (1.21)  (0.48)     (1.36)  (1.45)  (55.5)     (4.85)  (4.76)  (1.33) 
Age 61-62  48.2  49.4  1.19   Age 56-57  47.9  45.3  -2.60   Above ret. age  42.3  36.6  -5.78 
  (0.54)  (1.13)  (1.21)     (1.01)  (1.29)  (0.79)     (3.77)  (4.29)  (2.11) 
Difference  -0.68  -0.17  0.51   Difference  2.22  -1.44  -3.66   Difference  3.44  -3.97  -7.41 
  (1.16)  (0.71)  (1.30)     (0.89)  (0.92)  (0.92)     (2.51)  (2.46)  (2.56) 
Panel C: Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Age 58-59  42.1  40.8  -1.29   Age 53-54  34.2  33.4  -0.88   Below ret. age  33.0  29.1  -3.78 
  (1.97)  (2.11)  (0.79)     (4.74)  (4.86)  (1.10)     (7.73)  (8.24)  (2.36) 
Age 61-62  39.3  39.3  0.00   Age 56-57  37.0  33.2  -3.80   Above ret. age  31.4  23.3  -8.09 
  (1.08)  (1.41)  (1.21)     (4.72)  (4.66)  (1.28)     (6.25)  (6.63)  (3.11) 
Difference  -2.87  -1.57  1.30   Difference  2.73  -0.20  -2.93   Difference  -1.50  -5.81  -4.31 
  (1.76)  (1.89)  (1.44)     (1.32)  (1.56)  (1.67)     (3.39)  (4.90)  (3.87) 
  Note: * Least educated group comprises men and women with two-year age brackets below and above the gender specific pension age. Source: ULMS, own calculations.   39 
Against the aforementioned institutional background it is not surprising that the share 
of  workers  who  reduce  their  working  hours  at  the  intensive  margin  is  low,  and  the  vast 
majority is concentrated in low skilled service sector occupations (with teachers being the 
only numerous exception). As Table 5 shows, women reduce their yearly labor supply by 281 
hours or on average 17 percent (implying an income elasticity of working hours of minus 
0.19). However, the effect is strongest for the least educated women and men. Workers in the 
lowest educational  group (primary or unfinished secondary education)  reduce their  yearly 
working  time  by  460  hours,  which  is  a  substantial  reduction  of  34  percent  (implying  an 
income elasticity of working hours of minus 0.48). These results hold also in the regression 
set-up and are robust to the stepwise inclusion of various control variables (Table A17 to 
Table  A20)  as  well  as  individual  fixed  effects.  The  coefficient  from  the  random  effects 
estimation (which is preferred over the fixed effects model on efficiency grounds) is less 
precisely estimated, but even larger for the low educated (Table A21). 
The  results  deliver  two  interesting  insights:  First,  labor  supply  adjustments  at  the 
intensive margin are predominantly realized through the number of working weeks rather than 
weekly working hours. This suggests that workers adjust labor supply differently when they 
are constrained in their hours choice set as is the case in Ukraine. Second, due to the gender 
specific occupational structure there are no labor supply effects at the intensive margin for the 
male sample. Reducing working hours is only possible in few (with the exception of teachers 
mostly low skilled) service occupations. Women who reduced their yearly or weekly working 
time by at least ten percent are employed in elementary service and sales occupations or 
teachers. Male teachers, drivers, mobile plant operators as well as craft and trade operators 
were most likely to reduce working weeks and hours by more than ten percent.
30   
                                                           
30 Today’s labor supply choice might be partly correlated with the past occupational choice. When controlling 
for the occupation held in 1986 (which can be considered exogenous to recent retirement decisions) the results   40 
4.4  Regression Discontinuity Estimation 
Moving  from  the  DiD  to  an  RD  design  has  two  advantages:  it  allows  for  more 
flexibility in functional form around the threshold and adds to the estimation precision as 
more data can be used. Upon reaching pension age, the probability of receiving an old-age 
pension (i.e. the binary treatment) jumps discontinuously. The discontinuity used to identify 
the income effect in the retirement decision is based on an eligibility criterion defined by age. 
Regression discontinuities in age eligibility generally differ from ordinary RD designs in that 
individuals cannot reject the assignment to treatment and in that the assignment to treatment is 
certain (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
31 The basic idea of the sharp RD design is that the causal 
treatment effect of the model  i i i i x y b a + =  can be obtained by comparing mean outcomes of 
those aged slightly above with those slightly below the treatment threshold:
32 
- + - = y y b                   (4) 
 
In  order  to  estimate  the  income  effect  from  the  pension  increase  over  time,  a 
combination  of  two  regression  discontinuity  estimators  generates  the  Regression 
Discontinuity Difference (RDD) estimator. A parametric version of the RD design can be 
implemented  by  lower-order  polynomial  regressions  in  order  to  provide  an  alternative 
estimate of the average treatment effect. The estimator in the RDD framework is specified as 
the change in the retirement ratios at the pension age between the two points in time:
33 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] c X Y Y E c X Y Y E ATE i i i i RDD = - - = - = 0 1 0 1 2003 2003 2005 2005    (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for women are robust, while those for the less educated become insignificant due to the small sample size (Table 
A21). 
31 For the mechanism and identifying conditions of RD designs see Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001).  
32  The  absence  of  exact  date  of  birth  information  in  UHBS  implies  an  implementation  of  the  regression 
discontinuity  estimator  with  relatively  broad  discrete  categories  (years  of  age).  Producing  evidence  from 
‘narrower’ discrete age variables would be desirable but problematic due to small sample sizes. 
33 Polynomials of degree two are applied in the estimation. The age variable is centred at the gender-specific 
pension age. The results are robust to the use of higher order polynomials.    41 
Table 6: Difference-in-Regression-Discontinuity estimation 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 
      Men        
Treatment effect  0.188***  0.187***  0.176***  0.176***  0.174***  0.175*** 
  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Norm. age  0.058***  0.060***  0.068***  0.067***  0.066***  0.066*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Norm. age squared  0.003*  0.003**  0.003**  0.003**  0.003**  0.003** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Pension age  0.315***  0.309***  0.315***  0.315***  0.319***  0.317*** 
  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Norm. age*pension age  -0.013  -0.018  -0.026  -0.026  -0.025  -0.024 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Norm. age squ.*pension age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Post-increase  -0.054  -0.063  -0.058  -0.058  -0.056  -0.056 
  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
Observations  4690  4690  4690  4690  4690  4690 
R-squared  0.571  0.585  0.601  0.602  0.603  0.604 
      Women       
Treatment effect  0.103**  0.097**  0.088**  0.088**  0.086**  0.086** 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Norm. age  0.029***  0.026***  0.034***  0.034***  0.033***  0.033*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Norm. age squared  0.002***  0.001***  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Pension age  0.336***  0.344***  0.348***  0.348***  0.350***  0.351*** 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Norm. age*pension age  0.051***  0.050***  0.048***  0.048***  0.048***  0.048*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Norm. age squ.*pension age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Post-increase  -0.024  -0.019  -0.018  -0.017  -0.016  -0.015 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Observations  6762  6762  6762  6762  6762  6762 
R-squared  0.618  0.634  0.653  0.653  0.653  0.653 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls & assets  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Labor market structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: For control details see Table 3. Coefficients of Normalized age*post-increase, Normalized age squ.*post-
increase and constant are omitted from the table for space reasons. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS, own calculations.   42 
As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2009), the validity of the RD design can be tested by 
including covariates, which should neither change the estimates of interest nor their standard 
errors. Table 6 shows that the retirement effect of the pension increase for men and women is 
significantly positive and very stable when adding covariates in a stepwise fashion. Thus, the 
data confirm the theoretical irrelevance of covariates for the pure income effect (cp. Lee and 
Lemieux, 2009). The RDD estimates compare quite well to the DiD results but seem slightly 
larger for men and slightly smaller for women. Both, DiD and RDD estimates report the 
treatment effect of the pension increase for compliers, however, the RDD estimator is only 
identified for those exactly at the pension age discontinuity. As such, the correct comparison 
must  be  made  with  DiD  results  using  very  narrow  comparison  groups.  The  one  year 
bandwidth DiD treatment effect is 0.223 for men and 0.101 for women (Table A15) which is 
indeed close to the RDD results. Men seem to respond strongest immediately after reaching 
pension age while women respond within the first two years, indicating their higher flexibility 
in joint retirement decisions.  
 
5   Pension Generosity and Old-Age Poverty Reduction 
The  proclaimed  public  policy  objective  of  the  sudden  increase  in  old-age  pension 
benefits was to reduce old-age poverty. But did the policy actually succeed in meeting its 
objective? To evaluate its effect, this section presents evidence based on an individual annual 
disposable income measure, which combines all yearly income sources regardless of whether 
they were received in cash or in kind (including net labor incomes from all available jobs, 
state transfers and benefits, gross personal transfers, interest and dividends reported in the 
individual  questionnaire).
34  Total  income  is  assessed  against  a  country  specific  absolute 
                                                           
34 While it might seem preferable to measure poverty in terms of consumption, substantial difficulties stem from 
the pooling of household resources and the lack of individual level consumption data (for a comparison and 
methodological discussion of income and consumption poverty in Ukraine, see Brück et al., 2010).   43 
poverty line from the World Bank (2007). The line of 187 UAH per capita per month (37 
USD in 2005 terms) represents a basket that satisfies minimal needs in the form of food 
purchases, non-food goods and services. According to this measure, poverty in 2003 was 
lower among those above pension age (45.4 percent) than among to those just below pension 
age (46.5 percent). In 2005, the share of the poor declined to 2.0 percent and 21.9 percent 
respectively, indicating the eradication of income poverty among those in pension age. This is 
not  surprising  as  the  minimum  pension  was  set  close  to  the  World  Bank  line.  When 
benchmarking poverty in terms of a more generous poverty line defined by the Ukrainian 
parliament
35 (which is thought of as the level of socially acceptable minimum consumption), 
poverty is reduced from 74.7 percent to 49.1 percent among those below pension age and 
from 69.5 percent to 45.3 percent among recent retirees. Although this is a notable success it 
is uncertain whether the reduction is attributable to the pension policy. The overall success 
may be driven by a common trend mirrored in Ukraine’s substantial annual GDP growth of 7-
8 percent throughout the early 2000s with corresponding wage growth.  
To estimate the impact of the pension increase on poverty, the same DiD approach is 
used as before. The actual distance to the World Bank poverty line and the gender specific 
relative position to the average disposable income (of the working aged between 45 years and 
the pension age) are more informative metrics of poverty than the headcount. The monetary 
gain  from  the  pension  change  amounts  to  roughly  50  percent  of  the  poverty  line  for  the 
average pensioner, while the advancement in the relative position lies between 23 percent and 
25  percent  (Table  7).  These  effects  are  robust  to  controlling  for  demographic  and  other 
characteristics. Due to the concurrent wage growth, pensioners’ relative improvement is less 
pronounced  than  their  absolute  gain.  The  estimates  make  clear  that  the  government’s 
minimum pension increase has met the policy objective of improving pensioners’ absolute 
                                                           
35 This line is located at 328 UAH (in 2005 terms).   44 
and  relative  economic  position  despite  significantly  higher  retirement  rates.  Labor  supply 
responses  have  partly  outweighed  income  gains  as  expectable  from  the  standard  income-
leisure model. 
 
Table 7: Effect of pension increase on absolute and relative deprivation 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Dependent variable  Position to the  
absolute poverty line  
(poverty gap) 
Relative position to  
gender specific mean  
disposable income 
 
Treatment effect  0.457***  0.529***  0.227***  0.248*** 
  (0.161)  (0.157)  (0.076)  (0.073) 
Pension age  0.253***  0.122**  0.094**  0.063* 
  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Post-increase  0.724***  0.655***  0.041  -0.000 
  (0.102)  (0.094)  (0.053)  (0.048) 
Constant  0.283***  -2.033***  0.856***  -0.010 
  (0.045)  (0.288)  (0.029)  (0.152) 
Full controls  —  X  —  X 
Observations  1977  1977  1977  1977 
R-squared  0.239  0.340  0.179  0.277 
Note: All regressions estimated with OLS. Regressions for full sample of men and women. The comparison 
group comprises one year prior and one year post pension age. Position to the absolute poverty line computes the 
value of total individual disposable income as percentage of the absolute poverty line computed by the World 
Bank (see text for details). Relative position calculated with respect to the gender specific yearly mean of total 
individual disposable income of the population aged between 45 and pension age. For control details see Table 3. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS, own calculations. 
 
6  Discussion of Potential General Equilibrium Effects 
As argued before, the estimated treatment effects have the interpretation of causal pure 
income effects due to the non-means-tested and non-retirement-tested nature of the Ukrainian 
pension system. However, the results measure short-run responses to the pension increase (up 
to 2.5 years after implementation) which may differ from medium or long-term responses—
depending on general equilibrium effects. Those are likely to occur whenever a substantial 
fraction of the population is affected by a policy change. In the case of the Ukrainian pension   45 
reform, the higher disposable income of the elderly  may induce indirect and direct wage 
effects  thus  altering  the  opportunity  costs  of  retirement.  Indirectly,  the  reform  can  affect 
wages  if  additional  consumption  of  the  pensioners  alters  the  overall  demand  and  price 
structure of the economy. This may have knock-on effects on the labor market. A direct effect 
on wages could occur through additional retirement, i.e. reduced aggregate labor supply. A 
back-of-the-envelope  calculation  reveals  that  additionally  induced  retirement  amounts  to 
roughly 413,000 persons or 2.4 percent of the pre-2004 labor force. Indeed, the trend in real 
wage growth changes after the implementation of the pension rise (Figure A4). After 2004, 
the annual real wage growth exceeds the expected path by 5.6 percent. If the higher wage 
growth was merely a compositional phenomenon (because workers with mainly Soviet era 
skills left the labor force) the opportunity costs of individuals in pension age should not be 
affected. If, however, this rapid wage growth was caused by labor supply shortages, shadow 
wages of pensioners would increase and thereby reduce retirement incentives. By computing 
real wage growth rates for different age groups it is possible to show that employees above 
the pension age threshold enjoyed larger wage increases than the control groups (Figure A5). 
Especially, the manpower of pension aged men was in high demand after the pension rise. 
These wage patterns also indicate that potential demand explanations for the observed labor 
supply patterns do not apply. 
 
7  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper provides unique econometric evidence on the pure income effect on labor 
supply. The exogenous and universal increase in old-age pension benefits in Ukraine in 2004 
increased the probability of retiring at the statutory pension age by 30 to 47 percent (extensive 
margin  of  labor  supply).  Corresponding  to  the  incentive  structure  the  retirement  effect  is 
strongest for the less educated. Unlike in industrialized countries, adjustments of individual   46 
labor supply at the intensive margin are only modest since workers are restricted in their 
choices  of  working  hours.  The  analysis  reveals  that  only  women  and  the  least  educated 
workers adapt their yearly working time, mainly through reductions of yearly working weeks. 
Although men react stronger at the extensive and women at the intensive margin of labor 
supply the overall effect is roughly comparable across gender. From a welfare perspective, the 
benefit increase lifts the majority of pensioners out of poverty, even though the reduction in 
labor supply attenuates the pure welfare effect of the pension increase. 
Although pension systems and economic circumstances differ across countries, the 
behavioral results are informative about the existence of labor supply effects that arise from 
universal benefit policies in general. Furthermore, the empirical results provide rare insights 
for many developing or emerging countries facing similar challenges. Like Ukraine several 
countries currently introduce or reform their pension systems (e.g., for Brazil see de Carvalho 
Filho, 2008). This is especially true for (formerly) Socialist countries, as they share a common 
labor market legacy and similarly structured pension systems, including full coverage, low 
pension  ages  and  low  correlation  between  contributions  and  benefits.  More  specifically, 
Ukraine’s quasi-pension experiment delivers the following policy conclusions:  
First, an optimal policy design should take into account potential spill-over effects on 
the  labor  market,  i.e.  through  reduced  aggregate  labor  supply.  Second,  changes  in  labor 
market incentives caused by minimum pension guarantees or flat social benefits differ across 
subgroups  of  the  labor  force  depending  on  opportunity  costs  and  the  marginal  utility  of 
wealth. Third, large scale pension policies may induce direct and indirect wage effects which 
mitigate retirement incentives. Fourth, a generous full-coverage pension system is able to 
achieve welfare objectives (reduce old-age poverty) although the success of such a policy has 
to be contrasted with its labor supply effects, fiscal costs and the intergenerational burden. 
Combating  poverty  with  the  help  of  untargeted  old-age  benefits  is  fiscally  costly.  The   47 
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Note: Depicted are actual working hours; however, the distributions for contractual working hours look similar, 







































Note: Retirement is defined as receiving old-age pension benefits and reporting no income-generating activity in 
the reference week. Those in pension age directly report that they are not searching for jobs because of having 
reached the pension age. Income generating activities comprise having dependent employment for at least one 
hour per week with the expectation to be paid (including temporary and casual work), working in a family 
enterprise (even when being unpaid helper) or being self-employed or entrepreneur. Income generating activities 
exclude pure subsistence agriculture. The definition of ‘income generating activity’ differs slightly between the 
2004 and 2007 wave of the ULMS, however, the definition chosen here guarantees the highest possible level of 
comparability. The labor force basis excludes individuals who are receiving disability pensions and those who 
have retired on early retirement schemes (retirement for years of service). Some very few individuals report 
being generally entitled to old-age benefits, but having recently not been paid benefits (pension arrears); those 
individuals are included in the pensioner group. Source: ULMS, own calculations.  
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Figure A3: Observational densities around the pension age threshold, by survey year 
 


















































Graphs by UHBS wave
  
Note: The vertical lines indicate the relevant pension age for state pensions. The differences in densities do obviously not reflect sorting around the threshold, but reflect 
different sizes of birth cohorts of the Ukrainian population. For men, the threshold ‘moves’ through the years of the WWII birth cohorts, producing low densities below 







Figure A4: Change in real wage growth after September 2004 
 
 
Note: Trend period 1 spans January 2002 to September 2004, trend period 2 spans September 2004 to October 
2008.  Real  wages  CPI  deflated  to  January  2002.  Source:  State  Statistics  Committee  of  Ukraine,  own 




Figure A5: Real median wage growth for different age groups 
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Source: UHBS data; author’s calculations.   58 
 
Table A1: Variable description 
 
Variable  Definition UHBS  Definition ULMS 
Individual variables 
Pension aged**  Dummy = 1 if (i) a women is at 
least 55 years of age or (ii) a man is 
at least 60 years of age 
Dummy = 1 if (i) a women is at least 
55 years of age or (ii) a man is at 
least 60 years of age 
Retired  Dummy = 1 if respondent is not 
working, receives an old age 
pension and considers oneself as 
pensioner 
Dummy = 1 if respondent is not 
working, not searching for a job 
because of ‘old-age retirement’ and 
receives an old age pension 
Yearly working hours  —  Number of yearly working hours in 
current job computed from ordinary 
weekly working hours and weeks 
worked per year 
Yearly working weeks  —  Number of ordinary weeks worked 
per year in current job 
Weekly working hours  —  Number of ordinary hours worked 
per week in current job 
Years of schooling  Adjusted years of schooling were 
recalculated from total years of 
schooling and the highest 
educational degree ever attained 
Adjusted years of schooling 
according to the scheme in Brück, 
Danzer, Muravyev and Weisshaar 
(2009)* 
Age  Self-reported age of respondent in 
years 
Age of respondent in years; 
calculated from birth information*  
Married  Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is married 
Dummy =1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is married or 
cohabiting 
Widowed  Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is widowed 
Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is widowed 
Tenure  Lifetime work experience in years  Work experience in years 
Health variables  Body-Mass-Index and dummy for 
chronic disease (respondent reports 
disease and negative impact on 
physical activity) 
Dummy =1 if person reports one out 
of seven diagnosed chronic diseases 
Household variables 
Household size  Number of persons sharing a 
common budget and living at the 
same address 
Number of persons currently sharing 
a common budget and living at the 
same address 
Number of working 
age adults 
Total number of persons in working 
age in household; women 20-54, 
men 20-59 
Total number of persons in working 
age in household; women 20-54, men 
20-59 
Income by the 
working aged 
Sum of all incomes from the 
working aged population between 20 
and 45 years in the household; 
including labor income, gross 
Sum of all incomes from the working 
aged population between 20 and 45 
years in the household; including 
labor income, gross transfers,   59 
transfers, dividends and capital 
income, state benefits; calculated 
from individual questionnaires 
dividends and capital income, state 
benefits; calculated from individual 
questionnaires 
Assets  Asset indicator generated from factor 
analysis comprising information on 
home ownership, number of rooms, 
living space per capita, eleven 
housing facilities (e.g., sewerage, 
type of heating, hot water etc.) and 
ten durables (e.g., refrigerator, 
computer, and car). As monetary 
values are not reported, ‘values’ are 
assigned according to age, condition 
at purchase and origin of product. 
The first factor from the factor 
analysis is used as a household 
specific asset indicator. 
Asset indicator generated from factor 
analysis comprising information on 
home ownership, number of rooms, 
living space per capita, eleven 
housing facilities (e.g., sewerage, 
type of heating, hot water etc.) and 
ten durables (e.g., refrigerator, 
computer, and car). As monetary 
values are not reported, ‘values’ are 
assigned according to age and 
condition at purchase (if bought in 
the last 12 months). The first factor 
from the factor analysis is used as a 
household specific asset indicator. 
Invalid person in HH  Dummy = 1 if household has 
member with invalidity status 
— 
Children up to age 17 
in HH 
Dummy = 1 if household contains 
children up to age 17 
Dummy = 1 if household contains 
children up to age 17 
City, Town, Village  Dummies = 1 if respondent lives in 
urban settlement of big size, smaller 
size or in rural settlement 
Dummies = 1 if respondent lives in 
urban settlement from 100,000 
inhabitants, settlement up to 99,999 
inhabitants or rural settlement 
Oblast  Dummies for oblasts (26 regions)  Dummies for oblasts (26 reg.) 
Interview year  Dummies for all interview years 
2002-2006. Interviews were taken in 
December. 
Dummies for all interview years 
2003, 2004, 2007. Interviews were 
predominantly taken between May 
and July. 
Labor market variables   
Regional share of 
employment in 
mining 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in mining sector, 
computed for 78 regional clusters  
— 
Regional share of 
employment in 
agriculture 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in agriculture, computed 
for 78 regional clusters 
— 
Regional share of 
employment in state 
sector 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in the state sector, 
computed for 78 regional clusters 
— 
Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate, computed for 
78 regional clusters 
— 
Note: * These variables were cleaned to generate consistency across panel waves. ** For further robustness a 
variable was created that additionally requires a minimum of 20 years of work experience for women and 25 
years of work experience for men.     60 
Table A2: Robustness checks 1 & 2 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 
Robustness check 1: Probit specification, marginal effects reported 
Men             
Treatment effect  0.226***  0.213***  0.209**  0.206**  0.223***  0.225*** 
  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Observations  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.209  0.263  0.310  0.316  0.325  0.328 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.170***  0.173***  0.147**  0.147**  0.151**  0.152** 
  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.065) 
Observations  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845 
Pseudo R-squared  0.226  0.285  0.347  0.347  0.348  0.352 
 
 
           
Robustness check 2: Omission of those below minimum working year threshold 
Men             
Treatment effect  0.180***  0.160***  0.162***  0.157***  0.163***  0.163*** 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Constant  0.226***  0.174**  -56.762*  -54.972*  -56.023*  -56.862* 
  (0.028)  (0.078)  (32.678)  (32.540)  (32.414)  (32.392) 
Observations  1063  1063  1063  1063  1063  1063 
R-squared  0.260  0.317  0.372  0.376  0.386  0.388 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.137***  0.125***  0.098**  0.097**  0.100***  0.103*** 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Constant  0.115***  0.057  25.209  25.069  25.774  23.858 
  (0.015)  (0.061)  (18.700)  (18.724)  (18.707)  (18.620) 
Observations  1806  1806  1806  1806  1806  1806 
R-squared  0.266  0.321  0.388  0.388  0.389  0.392 
             
Region & Place FE  —   X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Labor market structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Linear probability models with dependent variable: retired. Individual controls include age, marital status, 
years of schooling, years of work experience; health status is a composite indicator for suffering from one of 
seven chronic diseases; household controls include household size, the presence of children up to age 17, the 
presence of a person with invalidity status, income generated from all other non-pension eligible household 
members and assets; labor market structure comprises the sub-regional unemployment rate, share of employees in 
mining, in agriculture and share of state employment. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS, own calculations.   61 
 
 
Table A3: OLS and IV estimation of the effect of pension receipt on retirement 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
           
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 
                 Full sample    Men          Women                    
 
  OLS  2SLS  First stage    OLS  2SLS  First stage    OLS  2SLS  First stage 
                       
Pension Receiver  0.359***  0.427***      0.412***  0.644***      0.363***  0.439**   
  (0.020)  (0.041)      (0.031)  (0.073)      (0.038)  (0.176)   
Pension eligible*post-increase      0.679***        0.665***        0.223*** 
      (0.024)        (0.046)        (0.026) 
Constant  -0.749***  -0.488*  -2.976***    1.319***  1.297***  0.253    -1.039  0.000  -12.30*** 
  (0.225)  (0.266)  (0.179)    (0.200)  (0.200)  (0.189)    (0.661)  (2.443)  (0.307) 
Observations  2942  2942  2942    1097  1097  1097    1845  1845  1845 
F-stat      77.9        209.9        71.5 
R-squared 
Partial R-squared 
0.325  0.321   
0.212 
  0.314  0.274   
0.166 
  0.338  0.336   
0.038 
Note: Dependent variable: retired. All regressions control for full set of controls (see Table 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses;    








Table A4: Labor supply effect of pension increase—ULMS 
 
  (1)  (2) 





Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
     
Treatment effect  0.146**  0.223** 
  (0.0573)  (0.104) 
Pension aged  0.337***  0.355*** 
  (0.041)  (0.049) 
Post-pension increase  0.059  0.023 
  (0.0456)  (0.060) 
Constant  0.137  0.199 
  (0.433)  (0.477) 
Observations  713  365 
R-squared  0.171  0.159 
Note:  Regressions  control  for  age  dummies,  marital  status,  education,  chronic  diseases,  household  size, 
presence of children in household, income generated by other household members, region of settlement and 
exclude households which changed composition between 2004 and 2007. Age brackets +/- 3 age cohorts 
around pension age with year of pension age excluded. Pension aged reflects retirement eligibility. Robust 
standard errors clustered by household size in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 
2003-2007, own calculations.   63
 
 
Table A5: Robustness checks 3 & 4 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
             
Robustness check 3: Comparison 2002/03 vs. 2004/05 
Men             
Treatment effect  0.114**  0.101**  0.088*  0.085*  0.089*  0.090* 
  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Constant  0.215***  0.142**  -51.110*  -49.833*  -50.366*  -51.078* 
  (0.027)  (0.067)  (28.093)  (28.090)  (27.952)  (27.901) 
Observations  1436  1436  1436  1436  1436  1436 
R-squared  0.273  0.311  0.354  0.357  0.363  0.364 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.113***  0.102***  0.088***  0.087***  0.089***  0.090*** 
  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Constant  0.111***  0.044  24.929  24.946  25.207  24.155 
  (0.015)  (0.048)  (16.228)  (16.225)  (16.222)  (16.151) 
Observations  2465  2465  2465  2465  2465  2465 
R-squared  0.280  0.333  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.383 
             
 
Robustness check 4: Comparison 2002 vs. 2005 
Men             
Treatment effect  0.127**  0.106*  0.120*  0.120*  0.115*  0.115* 
  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.062) 
Constant  0.185***  0.099  -56.734  -53.933  -52.220  -52.989 
  (0.034)  (0.087)  (36.587)  (36.596)  (36.600)  (36.687) 
Observations  717  717  717  717  717  717 
R-squared  0.342  0.387  0.412  0.415  0.420  0.422 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.165***  0.172***  0.149***  0.149***  0.154***  0.152*** 
  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Constant  0.129***  0.137*  41.624*  41.573*  42.279*  40.355* 
  (0.022)  (0.081)  (22.349)  (22.374)  (22.446)  (22.499) 
Observations  1257  1257  1257  1257  1257  1257 
R-squared  0.281  0.343  0.399  0.399  0.401  0.403 
             
Region & Place FE  —   X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Labor market 
structure 
—  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: For control details see Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: UHBS, own calculations.   64 
Table A6: Data Overview ULMS 
 
  Pre-increase period        Post- increase period   
  mean  min  max      mean  min  max 
Yearly working hours  1959.1  0  4992      1919.8  0  4680 
Actual working hours reference week  38.8  0  98      39.3  0  90 
Normal weekly working hours  41.2  3  98      40.2  0  90 
Yearly working weeks  47.47  0  52      47.47  4  52 
Share working less than full-time  0.061  0  1      0.073  0  1 
             
  Pre-increase period        Post- increase period   
  mean  min  max      mean  min  max 
Male  0.383  0  1      0.376  0  1 
Married  0.786  0  1      0.743  0  1 
Age  53.8  43  65      57.5  47  68 
Chronic disease  0.676  0  1      0.680  0  1 
Years of schooling  11.6  4  15      11.6  4  15 
Household size  3.1  1  13      3.0  1  9 
Presence of children (0-17 years)  0.307  0  1      0.265  0  1 
Income from other household members  492.7  0  8650      1088.7  0  8376.1 
Kiev  0.038  0  1      0.041  0  1 
East  0.268  0  1      0.260  0  1 
West  0.197  0  1      0.204  0  1 
Centre  0.272  0  1      0.277  0  1 
South  0.191  0  1      0.218  0  1 
Rural  0.362  0  1      0.369  0  1 
   Note: Number of observations in pre-reform period: 1,252 and in post-reform period: 626. Source: ULMS, own calculations.   65 












age   
  Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Diff.  s.e.    Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Diff.  s.e. 
Retired  0.334  (0.014)  0.409  (0.018)  0.075  (0.023)    0.100  (0.010)  0.607  (0.016)  0.506  (0.019) 
Age  54.94  (0.047)  55.19  (0.056)  0.243  (0.073)    53.52  (0.017)  56.44  (0.016)  2.922  (0.023) 
Married  0.655  (0.014)  0.654  (0.018)  -0.001  (0.023)    0.670  (0.016)  0.639  (0.016)  -0.031  (0.022) 
Widowed  0.149  (0.011)  0.172  (0.014)  0.023  (0.018)    0.130  (0.011)  0.185  (0.013)  0.055  (0.017) 
Years worked  31.52  (0.154)  31.10  (0.172)  -0.428  (0.235)    30.29  (0.152)  32.33  (0.165)  2.038  (0.226) 
Years of schooling  11.79  (0.080)  12.00  (0.088)  0.208  (0.121)    11.99  (0.081)  11.77  (0.087)  -0.214  (0.119) 
At least 12 yrs of schooling  0.495  (0.015)  0.574  (0.018)  0.079  (0.024)    0.541  (0.017)  0.513  (0.016)  -0.028  (0.023) 
At least 14 yrs of schooling  0.233  (0.013)  0.222  (0.015)  -0.011  (0.020)    0.221  (0.014)  0.236  (0.014)  0.014  (0.020) 
Household size  2.591  (0.038)  2.620  (0.047)  0.028  (0.061)    2.649  (0.042)  2.560  (0.041)  -0.089  (0.059) 
Children up to 17 in household  0.213  (0.012)  0.218  (0.015)  0.004  (0.020)    0.217  (0.014)  0.214  (0.013)  -0.003  (0.019) 
Person with invalidity status in HH  0.056  (0.007)  0.074  (0.010)  0.018  (0.012)    0.070  (0.009)  0.057  (0.008)  -0.013  (0.011) 
Total income of other HH members  945.6  (64.6)  1574.0  (123.5)  628.5  (128.3)    1318.8  (98.8)  1085.1  (80.3)  -233.7  (126.5) 
Body Mass Index  27.48  (0.129)  27.60  (0.148)  0.118  (0.199)    27.37  (0.141)  27.68  (0.134)  0.313  (0.195) 
Reduced physical activity  0.362  (0.016)  0.307  (0.019)  -0.054  (0.025)    0.317  (0.018)  0.361  (0.017)  0.044  (0.025) 
Chronic disease  0.061  (0.007)  0.055  (0.008)  -0.006  (0.011)    0.051  (0.007)  0.067  (0.008)  0.016  (0.011) 
Medical treatment  0.099  (0.009)  0.106  (0.011)  0.007  (0.014)    0.095  (0.010)  0.108  (0.010)  0.012  (0.014) 
Regular physical activity (sport)  0.129  (0.010)  0.111  (0.012)  -0.018  (0.016)    0.117  (0.011)  0.126  (0.011)  0.009  (0.015) 
Village  0.289  (0.014)  0.348  (0.018)  0.058  (0.022)    0.292  (0.015)  0.332  (0.015)  0.039  (0.022) 
Town   0.296  (0.014)  0.268  (0.016)  -0.028  (0.021)    0.283  (0.015)  0.286  (0.015)  0.002  (0.021) 
City  0.415  (0.015)  0.384  (0.018)  -0.031  (0.023)    0.424  (0.017)  0.383  (0.016)  -0.042  (0.023) 
Region  39.30  (0.732)  40.48  (0.864)  1.176  (1.141)    40.31  (0.801)  39.28  (0.780)  -1.036  (0.559) 
    (cont.)  66 












age   
  Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Diff.  s.e.    Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Diff.  s.e. 
Retired  0.542  (0.018)  0.497  (0.027)  -0.045  (0.033)    0.200  (0.019)  0.735  (0.017)  0.535  (0.026) 
Age  60.49  (0.055)  60.01  (0.085)  -0.483  (0.100)    58.49  (0.024)  61.51  (0.019)  3.020  (0.031) 
Married  0.906  (0.011)  0.924  (0.014)  0.017  (0.019)    0.913  (0.014)  0.911  (0.011)  -0.002  (0.018) 
Widowed  0.048  (0.008)  0.035  (0.010)  -0.012  (0.013)    0.033  (0.009)  0.051  (0.008)  0.018  (0.013) 
Years worked  36.77  (0.202)  35.46  (0.321)  -1.304  (0.370)    34.40  (0.281)  37.61  (0.204)  3.207  (0.340) 
Years of schooling  11.11  (0.122)  11.79  (0.150)  0.680  (0.208)    11.94  (0.146)  10.92  (0.125)  -1.020  (0.196) 
At least 12 yrs of schooling  0.390  (0.018)  0.488  (0.027)  0.099  (0.032)    0.504  (0.024)  0.368  (0.019)  -0.136  (0.030) 
At least 14 yrs of schooling  0.221  (0.015)  0.247  (0.023)  0.026  (0.027)    0.264  (0.021)  0.207  (0.016)  -0.057  (0.026) 
Household size  2.707  (0.044)  2.621  (0.062)  -0.086  (0.078)    2.732  (0.058)  2.647  (0.046)  -0.084  (0.074) 
Children up to 17 in household  0.202  (0.015)  0.165  (0.020)  -0.037  (0.026)    0.198  (0.019)  0.186  (0.015)  -0.012  (0.024) 
Person with invalidity status in HH  0.045  (0.008)  0.041  (0.011)  -0.004  (0.013)    0.054  (0.011)  0.037  (0.007)  -0.017  (0.013) 
Total income of other HH members  668.6  (59.2)  1150.5  (159.0)  481.9  (138.4)    846.1  (109.7)  800.1  (78.9)  -45.9  (132.1) 
Body Mass Index  26.16  (0.121)  26.47  (0.180)  0.315  (0.217)    26.14  (0.158)  26.33  (0.130)  0.192  (0.206) 
Reduced physical activity  0.378  (0.021)  0.400  (0.032)  0.022  (0.038)    0.363  (0.029)  0.398  (0.022)  0.035  (0.036) 
Chronic disease  0.069  (0.009)  0.074  (0.014)  0.005  (0.017)    0.049  (0.011)  0.083  (0.011)  0.034  (0.016) 
Medical treatment  0.116  (0.012)  0.103  (0.017)  -0.013  (0.021)    0.097  (0.014)  0.122  (0.013)  0.025  (0.020) 
Regular physical activity (sport)  0.153  (0.013)  0.188  (0.021)  0.035  (0.024)    0.184  (0.019)  0.152  (0.014)  -0.032  (0.023) 
Village  0.383  (0.018)  0.388  (0.026)  0.005  (0.032)    0.374  (0.024)  0.391  (0.019)  0.017  (0.030) 
Town   0.279  (0.016)  0.285  (0.025)  0.007  (0.029)    0.266  (0.021)  0.290  (0.018)  0.024  (0.028) 
City  0.338  (0.017)  0.326  (0.025)  -0.012  (0.031)    0.360  (0.023)  0.318  (0.018)  -0.042  (0.029) 
Region  40.17  (0.859)  39.63  (1.316)  -0.537  (1.556)    40.36  (1.152)  39.77  (0.921)  -0.592  (1.477) 
   Note: ‘HH’ stands for ‘household’. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: UHBS, own calculations.     67
Table A8: Compositional change in educational attainments 
 
Men, aged 50-65  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Average years of schooling  11.3  11.5  11.6  11.8  11.8 
Composition shares           
Higher education  38.3  36.6  38.1  38.9  38.1 
Secondary education  37.9  44.6  46.1  48.5  50.6 
Lower education  23.9  18.8  15.8  12.7  11.3 
Source: UHBS, own calculations. 
 
Table A9: Retirement rates across survey years 
 
  Men  Women 
Age groups  58/59  61/62  53/54  56/57 
2002  0.187  0.692  0.129  0.536 
2003  0.213  0.687  0.094  0.564 
  (0.63)  -(0.12)  -(1.18)  (0.59) 
2004  0.203  0.715  0.100  0.633 
  (0.40)  (0.46)  -(0.97)  (2.13) 
2005  0.163  0.816  0.090  0.652 
  -(0.62)  (2.68)  -(1.41)  (2.72) 
2006  0.198  0.804  0.110  0.659 
  (0.30)  (2.39)  -(0.62)  (2.90) 
Note:  Report  values  are  retirement  rates.  T-statistics  in  parentheses  for  a  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  year 
coefficients  are  statistically  significant  different  from  the  base  category  (year  2002).  Source:  UHBS,  own 
calculations. 
 
Table A10: Difference-in-Differences in educational CDF 
 
Years of schooling  DiD in CDF  Robust s.e. 
6  0.403  (0.03) 
7  0.363  (0.03) 
8  0.361  (0.05) 
9  0.170  (0.22) 
10  0.232  (0.04) 
11  0.215  (0.06) 
12  0.084  (0.06) 
13  0.104  (0.06) 
14  0.138  (0.11) 
15  -0.081  (0.07) 
16  -0.101  (0.14) 
17  -0.009  (0.15) 
Note: Reported values are regression coefficients on interactions between years of schooling and the treatment 
indicator. Linear regressions are performed on pooled male and female sample in order to increase estimation 
precision. Dependent variable: retired. Small sample sizes for 6 and 9 years of schooling. Robust standard errors 
in  parentheses  for  the  hypotheses  that  DiD  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  the  control  group. 
Regressions  control  for  age,  year  and  gender  dummies  as  well  as  for  marital  status.  Source:  UHBS,  own 




Table A11: Robustness check excluding mining areas 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Men  Women 
   
—excluding mining area 
 
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
     
Treatment effect  0.158***  0.127*** 
  (0.061)  (0.042) 
Pension age  0.473***  0.444*** 
  (0.036)  (0.029) 
Post-pension increase   -0.040  -0.038* 
  (0.043)  (0.022) 
Constant   0.210***  0.117*** 
  (0.027)  (0.015) 
Observations  1050  1748 
R-squared  0.266  0.270 
Note: Linear regressions including full set of control. For control details see Table 3. Mining areas are 
regions in which more than 20 percent of regional employment is concentrated in the mining sector (3 out of 




Table A12: Impact of pension increase on household composition 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
  Pooled   Men   Women 























Treatment effect  -0.062  0.050  0.070  0.085  -0.149  0.008 
  (0.077)  (0.062)  (0.105)  (0.086)  (0.096)  (0.078) 
Pension age  0.039  -0.968***  0.177  -0.983***  0.135  -1.048*** 
  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.151)  (0.130)  (0.151)  (0.120) 
Post-pension 
increase 
0.070  0.016  -0.088  -0.162**  0.147**  0.098* 
(0.057)  (0.046)  (0.080)  (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.056) 
Constant  5.405  7.343  46.591  -42.617  38.226  9.454 
  (7.620)  (6.142)  (57.212)  (51.532)  (46.920)  (37.915) 
Observations  2942  2942  1097  1097  1845  1845 
R-squared  0.587  0.558  0.626  0.573  0.572  0.548 
Note: Linear regressions including full set of control. For control details see Table 3. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS, own calculations.   69
 
Table A13: Labor supply effect of pension increase 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Pooled, no household  
re-formation 
Pooled, with household 
re-formation 
 
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 
Treatment effect  0.150***  0.139*** 
  (0.045)  (0.041) 
Pension age  0.344***  0.332*** 
  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Post-pension increase  0.045  0.041 
  (0.036)  (0.033) 
Constant  0.156  0.150 
  (0.323)  (0.281) 
Observations  1078  1339 
R-squared  0.156  0.168 
Note:  Regressions  control  for  age  dummies,  gender,  marital  status,  education,  chronic  diseases, 
household size, presence of children in household, income generated by other household members, 
region of settlement. Age brackets +/- 3 age cohorts around pension age with year of pension age 
excluded.  Retirement  defined  by  eligibility.  Column  (1)  excludes  households  which  changed 
composition  between  2004  and  2007.  Robust  standard  errors  clustered  by  household  size  in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations.   
 
 
Table A14: Retirement and eligibility of couples 
 
      Age of Husband   
Age of Wife    50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
50-54  2003  7.4%  16.7%  59.6%  a  a 
  2005  9.6%  13.0%  50.0%  73.7%  a 
  sig.  *  **  *     
55-59  2003  41.0%  46.6%  76.5%  88.5%  a 
  2005  42.0%  54.8%  81.9%  86.7%  a 
  sig.    **  **       
60-64  2003  a  82.6%  88.9%  93.8%  100% 
  2005  a  81.3%  89.2%  92.9%  100% 
  sig.              
65-69  2003  a  a  92.1%  95.6%  97.6% 
  2005  a  a  96.2%  96.6%  95.3% 
  sig.      *     * 
70-74  2003  a  a  a  97.1%  99.1% 
  2005  a  a  a  100%  100% 
  sig.         *    
Note: a. Less than 30 obs. in cell. Framed numbers contain between 30 and 40 observations. Cells report 
share of couples with at least one partner retired. Shaded area marks retirement eligibility of at least one 







Table A15: Share of jointly retired couples 
 
      Age of Husband   
Age of Wife    50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
50-54  2003  14.3%  17.6%  9.7%  a  a 
  2005  10.3%  12.9%  5.9%  a  a 
  sig.           
55-59  2003  0.0%  16.2%  53.8%  72.2%  a 
  2005  4.8%  11.4%  65.6%  75.0%  a 
  sig.    *  ***       
60-64  2003  a  21.1%  75.0%  76.4%  83.0% 
  2005  a  11.5%  77.4%  79.8%  81.5% 
  sig.              
65-69  2003  a  a  75.9%  77.7%  88.4% 
  2005  a  a  76.5%  83.2%  88.8% 
  sig.         **    
70-74  2003  a  a  a  93.9%  91.8% 
  2005  a  a  a  88.6%  93.8% 
  sig.              
Note: a. Less than 30 obs. in cell. Framed numbers contain between 30 and 40 observations. Cells 
report share of jointly retired couples in all couples with at least one partner retired. Shaded area 
marks  age  of  joint  normal  pension  age.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.  Source:  UHBS,  own 
calculations.  





Table A16: Difference-in-Differences—choice of comparison bandwidth 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Dependent variable  Retired (0/1) 
 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
   
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.223***  0.176***  0.146***  0.118***  0.105*** 
  (0.086)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.031) 
Constant  0.297***  0.215***  0.199***  0.184***  0.166*** 
  (0.044)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Observations  538  1097  1729  2472  3226 
R-squared  0.194  0.272  0.311  0.340  0.381 
 
  Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.101*  0.133***  0.091***  0.077***  0.057** 
  (0.057)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Constant  0.124***  0.111***  0.099***  0.084***  0.073*** 
  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Observations  996  1845  2675  3555  4398 
R-squared  0.216  0.271  0.318  0.372  0.414 
Note: Linear regressions including full set of control. For control details see Table 3. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS, own calculations. 
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Table A17: Difference-in-Differences—yearly working hours 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   
  Full sample  Men  Women  Educational 
category 1 
 
Dependent variable  Yearly working hours 
 
Without Controls 
       
Treatment effect  -94.95  114.41  -280.46***  -460.05** 
  (59.63)  (80.65)  (86.01)  (200.69) 
Constant  1,722.59***  2,086.04***  1,626.93***  1,360.62*** 
  (122.95)  (95.83)  (251.90)  (415.32) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.178  0.169  0.109  0.041 
Observations  1877  902  976  211 
Number of truncated observations  2794  999  1795  872 
 
Full controls 
       
Treatment effect  -119.99**  50.90  -281.12***  -449.02** 
  (60.88)  (81.48)  (84.86)  (226.29) 
Constant  1,924.74*  2,799.48**  917.38  1,868.49 
  (1,084.40)  (1,374.40)  (798.14)  (1,802.27) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.049  0.058  0. 045  0.061 
Observations  1740  833  906  192 
Number of truncated observations  2623  941  1682  815 
Note:  Table  reports  estimates  from  a  truncated  linear  regression,  truncation  at  zero. Regressions  with  no 
controls include a gender dummy and year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement 
type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or separated), a dummy for 
one out of seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total income of 
other household members. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by id; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
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Table A18: Difference-in-Differences—working weeks and weekly working hours 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
  
Full sample Men Women Educational 
category 1
Full sample  Men Women Educational 
category 1
Dependent variable  Yearly working weeks    Weekly working hours 
   
No Controls     
Treatment effect  -1.619**  0.510  -3.655***  -7.413***    -0.853  1.295  -2.929*  -4.311 
  (0.703)  (1.300)  (0.917)  (2.564)    (1.117)  (1.443)  (1.671)  (3.870) 
Constant  47.671***  48.856***  45.636***  38.888***    41.963***  42.126***  34.232***  32.918*** 
  (1.209)  (1.190)  (1.023)  (4.854)    (0.416)  (1.968)  (4.737)  (7.728) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.021  0.009  0.022  0.011    0.019  0.017  0.017  0.014 
Observations  1877  902  976  211    1877  902  976  211 
Truncated observations  2794  999  1795  872    2794  999  1795  872 
 
Full controls 
                 
Treatment effect  -1.655**  0.081  -3.264***  -6.934**    -1.014  1.175  -2.722*  -3.451 
  (0.707)  (1.330)  (0.935)  (2.851)    (1.068)  (1.450)  (1.602)  (4.240) 
Constant  46.742***  77.838***  28.150***  58.697***    46.582*  63.268**  41.923*  5.665 
  (16.407)  (23.890)  (6.749)  (22.005)    (26.562)  (29.965)  (20.752)  (29.426) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.027  0.009  0.018  0.013    0.063  0.032  0.043  0.032 
Observations  1740  833  906  192    1740  833  906  192 
Truncated observations  2623  941  1682  815    2623  941  1682  815 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no controls include a gender dummy and year of birth fixed effects. 
Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or separated), a dummy for one out of 
seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total income of other household members. Educational category 1 means primary and 






Table A19: Difference-in-Differences—intensive margin, women sample 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Treatment effect  -297.641***  -300.563***  -288.328***  -277.110***  -281.119*** 
  (87.881)  (85.657)  (85.154)  (84.665)  (84.860) 
Constant  1,999.642***  1,929.807***  873.583  894.096  917.383 
  (195.489)  (209.033)  (774.364)  (782.222)  (798.138) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.014  0.024  0.039  0.044  0.045 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Treatment effect  -3.577***  -3.566***  -3.419***  -3.400***  -3.264*** 
  (0.986)  (0.960)  (0.938)  (0.930)  (0.935) 
Constant  45.740***  45.910***  25.524***  27.407***  28.150*** 
  (1.174)  (1.535)  (6.911)  (6.981)  (6.749) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.007  0.010  0.016  0.015  0.018 
           
Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Treatment effect  -3.013*  -2.961*  -2.870*  -2.678*  -2.722* 
  (1.664)  (1.641)  (1.615)  (1.614)  (1.602) 
Constant  36.989***  44.196***  41.375*  37.876*  41.923** 
  (2.970)  (4.330)  (21.344)  (21.101)  (20.752) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.010  0.027  0.035  0.029  0.043 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X 
Note:  Table  reports  estimates  from  a  truncated  linear  regression,  truncation  at  zero. Regressions  with  no 
controls include year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, 
years of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or separated), a dummy for one out of seven 
chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total income of other household 
members. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by id; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 








Table A20: Difference-in-Differences—intensive margin, least educated sample 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Treatment effect  -363.348*  -381.060*  -375.622*  -361.343*  -449.022** 
  (204.588)  (198.540)  (196.327)  (196.616)  (226.291) 
Constant  1,257.841***  1,010.884**  2,317.049  2,364.564  1,868.485 
  (463.954)  (464.929)  (1,652.760)  (1,695.076)  (1,802.273) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.056  0.036  0.065  0.068  0.061 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Treatment effect  -7.324**  -8.356**  -8.313**  -8.339**  -6.934** 
  (2.934)  (3.397)  (3.492)  (3.664)  (2.851) 
Constant  42.503***  49.107***  59.892***  59.858***  58.697*** 
  (6.735)  (1.814)  (22.748)  (22.608)  (22.005) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.006  0.004  0.018  0.017  0.013 
           
Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Treatment effect  -2.044  -2.499  -2.258  -2.403  -3.454 
  (3.257)  (3.308)  (3.513)  (3.478)  (4.240) 
Constant  40.987***  60.344***  -1.230  -1.421  5.665 
  (7.354)  (12.363)  (29.430)  (29.065)  (29.426) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.008  0.012  0.033  0.033  0.032 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no 
controls include a gender dummy and year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement 
type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or separated), a dummy 
for one out of seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total 
income  of  other  household  members.  Educational  category  1  means  primary  and  unfinished  education. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by id; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own 







Table A21: Robustness checks for labor supply responses at intensive margin 
 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
  Full sample    Sub sample of (1) 
 
  Baseline  Random 
effects 









Dependent variable  Yearly working hours 
               
Women 
Treatment effect  -265.7***  -228.8***    -260.3***  36.4  -354.4***  -244.1*** 
  (84.1)  (77.0)    (89.8)  (179.8)  (89.0)  (91.3) 
Constant  1,267.3      1,536.9  2,315.8*  225.9  954.5 
  (942.8)      (1,055.3)  (1,395.2)  (1,160.7)  (1,064.7) 
Observations  906  906    832  249  657  713 
 
R-squared  0.003  0.132    0.000  0.000  0.018  0.013 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
   
0.18 
         
               
Least educated 
Treatment effect  -449.0**  -459.7*    -375.52  -831.2*  -201.1  -457.5** 
  (226.3)  (256.3)    (259.69)  (425.0)  (225.7)  (221.7) 
Constant  1,868.5      1,523.7  -7,446.1***  1,401.7  3,341.0* 
  (1,802.3)      (1,493.4)  (2,782.3)  (2,422.3)  (1,744.6) 
Observations  192  192    173  60  132  156 
 
R-squared  0.061  0.282    0.046  0.021  0.054  0.076 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
   
0.99 
         
Note: All regressions include full set of controls (see Table 3). Regressions (1) and (3)-(6) are truncated linear 
regressions. Standard error clustered by id. Regression (2) is a random effects panel regression. The Hausman 
statistics tests the null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in coefficients from random effects vs. 
fixed effects model (the latter not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source ULMS, own calculations. 
 
 
 